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REVITALIZING INFORMED CONSENT AND 
PROTECTING PATIENT AUTONOMY:  AN APPEAL 
TO ABANDON OBJECTIVE CAUSATION 
EVELYN M. TENENBAUM∗ 
Introduction 
The purpose of informed consent laws is to ensure that patients receive 
sufficient information about the risks and alternatives of medical 
procedures to make their own health care decisions based on their personal 
values, preferences, and priorities.1  But in practice, informed consent laws 
are unfaithful to this underlying goal.2 
In all but four states, a patient cannot prevail on an informed consent 
claim without proving objective causation.  The patient must show that a 
reasonably prudent person in the patient’s medical condition would not 
have chosen the procedure had he been fully informed.  In applying this 
standard, the courts must focus on the hypothetical preferences of a 
reasonable person, rather than on the values of the individual patient.3  As a 
result, this standard undermines the primary purpose of the doctrine.4 
The medical information patients receive from physicians reflects the 
law’s focus on the hypothetical reasonable patient.5  The informed consent 
process often consists of a formalistic recitation of risks and alternatives 
intended to protect the physician against liability, rather than a joint process 
during which the physician and patient coordinate to ensure that the 
patient’s decisions are based on individual preferences and concerns.6  The 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act of 2010 (PPACA), the new 
federal health care legislation, recognizes this deficiency and includes a 
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 1. See infra Part I. 
 2. See infra Part II. 
 3. See infra Parts III-IV. 
 4. See infra Parts III-IV.  
 5. See infra Part VII. 
 6. See infra Part VIII. 
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program to “facilitate[] the incorporation of patient preferences and values 
into the medical plan.”7 
An important first step in improving the process of informed consent is 
to convince the courts and state legislatures to abandon objective causation 
and choose a standard that recognizes the importance of individual 
preferences and priorities. This change in focus is more important now than 
ever before.  The increasing complexity of medical care and the ever-
widening array of treatment choices make patient health care decisions 
more dependent on values and preferences than at any time in the past.8  
Moreover, with today’s technology, providing disclosures that take patient 
priorities into account need not be an undue burden on medical providers.  
New computer systems can help make the process easy, effective, and 
relatively inexpensive.9  
This article begins by tracing the history of informed consent and the 
evolution of that doctrine—including the adoption of an objective causation 
standard—to adapt to changes in medical care.  It then focuses on how 
objective causation undermines the purposes of informed consent, 
addresses the courts’ reasons for choosing that standard, and argues that 
those reasons do not justify using an objective standard.  This article 
recommends adopting a subjective causation standard and concludes by 
explaining why this change is essential to keep pace with modern 
developments in medical care. 
I. Brief Background on the Development of Informed Consent 
Informed consent is a relatively new concept in medicine.10  For more 
than twenty-four centuries, patients were expected to place their trust in 
their physicians, who made all medical decisions for them.11  It was not 
until the twentieth century, when medical care began to rapidly advance, 
                                                                                                                 
 7. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 299b-36(a) (West 2011). 
 8. See infra Part X. 
 9. See infra Part IX. 
 10. Wendy K. Mariner, Informed Consent in the Post-Modern Era, 13 LAW & SOC. 
INQUIRY, 385, 391 (1988) (“Our modern conceptions of disclosure and consent were entirely 
foreign to the definition of medical practice throughout its professional evolution.”). 
 11. Grant H. Morris, Dissing Disclosure: Just What the Doctor Ordered, 44 ARIZ. L. 
REV. 313, 314 (2002) (“For twenty-four centuries, physicians heeded Hippocrates’ advice.”); 
id. at 313 (“The physician . . . was not to be questioned or influenced by the patient’s 
uneducated opinions, irrational concerns, or emotional worries.”). 
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that the doctrine of informed consent gained traction12 and patient 
autonomy gained precedence over the formerly paternalistic role of 
physicians.13  
Hippocrates, who was born around 460 B.C.,14 counseled physicians to 
“conceal[] most things from the patient while . . . attending to him . . . 
revealing nothing of the patient’s future or present condition.”15  Physicians 
were to use their best judgment16 and not be influenced by “the patient’s 
uneducated opinions, irrational concerns or emotional worries.”17 
Correspondingly, the patient’s decision-making role was limited to 
selecting the best physician.18  After that, the patient was encouraged to 
cede all authority to the physician he chose.19  The American Medical 
Association formalized this view in its 1847 Code of Ethics, which states 
that patients should obey “the prescriptions of their physician . . . 
prompt[ly] and implicit[ly].  They should never permit their own crude 
opinions . . . to influence their attention to their physicians.”20 
                                                                                                                 
 12. R. Jason Richards, How We Got Where We Are: A Look at Informed Consent in 
Colorado—Past, Present, and Future, 26 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 69, 73-74 (2005) (“Even into the 
19th Century, physicians did not believe they needed to communicate with their patients for 
the purpose of involving them in the decision-making process. . . . [This] began to change by 
the turn of the twentieth century.”). 
 13. Ryan Childers et al., Informed Consent and the Surgeon, 208 J. AM. C. SURGEONS 
627, 627 (2009) (“[O]ver the past 50 years, patient autonomy and the right to individual self-
determination have replaced the previous belief that ‘doctor knows best.’”); Bryan J. 
Warren, Pennsylvania Medical Informed Consent Law: A Call to Protect Patient Autonomy 
Rights by Abandoning the Battery Approach, 38 DUQ. L. REV. 917, 920 (2000) (“[E]arly 
tenets of medicine encouraged a paternalistic approach to the patient, and even espoused 
avoiding discussions with the patient about the patient’s care.”); id. at 922 (“The belief 
among many physicians that a paternalistic and authoritarian approach is in the patient’s best 
interests remained prevalent well into the late 1900’s.”). 
 14. JOHN M. BARRY, THE GREAT INFLUENZA 16 (Penguin Press 2005). 
 15. Morris, supra note 11, at 313; Warren, supra note 13, at 920. 
 16. Morris, supra note 11, at 314 (“The physician’s duty was not merely to make his or 
her own judgments, but also, to make those judgments for the sole purpose of benefitting his 
or her patient.”).  
 17. Id. at 313. 
 18. Marjorie Maguire Shultz, From Informed Consent to Patient Choice: A New 
Protected Interest, 95 YALE L.J. 219, 221 (1985) (“[T]he patient was seen as making only 
one key decision, to place herself in a given doctor’s care, thereby delegating all subsequent 
authority to the doctor.”). 
 19. Mariner, supra note 10, at 389 (“The precepts of benevolence begot a conviction in 
the profession that patients should obey their doctors.”). 
 20. Warren, supra note 13, at 921.  
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Ironically, the enormous deference given to physicians was based in 
large part on the lack of scientific knowledge concerning medical care.  In 
deciding how to treat their patients, physicians relied heavily on logic 
coupled with observations made during their clinical experiences.21  They 
observed nature passively,22 rather than using experiments and rigorous 
scientific methods to test their conclusions and theories.23  For example, one 
of the most enduring methods of treating patients was bleeding,24 otherwise 
known as phlebotomy.25 This procedure was popular for so long partly 
because “[i]f a patient was flushed with a fever, it followed logically that if 
bleeding alleviated those symptoms—making the patient pale—it was a 
good thing.”26 
Meaningful, informed consent would have been almost impossible at this 
time because physicians had no empirical foundation to support discussions 
of risks and alternatives.27 Because their medical judgments were based on 
their intuition and observations, physicians understandably argued that only 
                                                                                                                 
 21. BARRY, supra note 14, at 25 (“Hippocratic writings had stated that the physician’s 
senses mattered far more than any objective measurement, so despite medicine’s use of 
logic, physicians had always avoided applying mathematics to the study of the body or 
disease.”).   
 22. Id. at 17 (“Those who wrote the Hippocratic texts, however, observed passively and 
reasoned actively.”). 
 23. Id. at 17 (“[T]he authors of the Hippocratic texts did not test their conclusions and 
theories.”), 25 (“Logic and observation failed because neither one tested the hypothesis 
rigorously.”).  
 24. Id. at 18 (“Bleeding was among the most common therapies employed to treat all 
manner of disorders.”). 
 25. Id. at 22. 
 26. Id.  
 27. Herrman L. Blumgart, Caring for the Patient, 270 NEW ENG. J. MED. 449, 449 
(1964) (“Somewhere between 1910 and 1912 in this country . . . a random patient, with a 
random disease, consulting a [physician] chosen at random had, for the first time in the 
history of mankind, a better than fifty-fifty chance of profiting from the encounter.”); Jay 
Katz, Informed Consent—Must It Remain a Fairy Tale?, 10 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & 
POL’Y 69, 76 (1994) (“[U]ntil the beginning of the twentieth century, physicians could not 
explain to their patients, or—from the perspective of hindsight—to themselves, which of 
their treatment recommendations were curative and which were not.”); Kristin Madison, 
Patients as “Regulators?” Patients’ Evolving Influence Over Health Care Delivery, 31 J. 
LEGAL MED. 9, 11 (2010) (“Today, the doctrine [of informed consent] typically requires 
physicians to obtain consent for treatment after disclosing factors such as the patient’s 
diagnosis, the proposed treatment’s nature and purpose, treatment risks, and treatment 
alternatives.”); Richards, supra note 12, at 74 (“[T]here was little understanding [even into 
the 19th century] of how one could cure a medical condition, and even less was known about 
what caused a particular malady.”). 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol64/iss4/8
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they were qualified to comprehend and apply their medical knowledge and 
their patients should not interfere.28 
Medical knowledge hardly advanced at all until the nineteenth century29 
when physicians began to challenge the purely theoretical and test their 
hypotheses.  They started to base medical care on numerical correlations 
between treatments and results and to use autopsies to correlate the 
condition of organs with symptoms and pathology.30  Only then did 
physicians begin to have a scientific explanation for their medical choices 
and information that might provide a basis for meaningful informed 
consent.  In fact, not until the twentieth century, as medicine developed a 
strong scientific foundation,31 did patients gain the right to be involved in 
the medical decisions concerning their care.32 
The cases on informed consent at the beginning of the twentieth century 
addressed only whether a physician could be held liable if the patient did 
not consent to a surgical procedure, not whether the patient received 
sufficient information to make an informed choice.33  Pratt v. Davis34 and 
                                                                                                                 
 28. Mariner, supra note 10, at 390 (“[P]hysicians argued that medical knowledge could 
only be correctly applied by one trained in the field, with a large measure of intuition based 
on clinical experience.”). 
 29. BARRY, supra note 14, at 16 (“[F]or the bulk of two and a half millennia—twenty-
five hundred years—the actual treatment of patients by physicians made almost no progress 
at all.”).  In 1869, Harvard’s president stated that “[t]he ignorance and general incompetency 
of the average graduate of the American medical schools, at the time when he receives the 
degree which turns him loose upon the community, is something horrible to contemplate.”  
Id. at 32.  
 30. Id. at 26 (“[T]he real point at which modern medicine diverged from the classic was 
in the studies of pathological anatomy by Louis and others [that] not only correlated 
treatments with results to reach a conclusion about the treatment’s efficacy[, but] . . . also 
used autopsies to correlate the condition of organs with symptoms.”). 
 31. Mariner, supra note 10, at 391 (“In the early 20th century, the medical profession 
consolidated its status on a growing knowledge base . . . .”); Richards, supra note 12, at 74 
(“[B]y the turn of the twentieth century . . . [a]dvances in medical science, technology, and 
training began to distinguish primitive medical practices from conventional medicine.”). 
 32. Mariner, supra note 10, at 391 (“Our modern conceptions of disclosure and consent 
were entirely foreign to the definition of medical practice throughout its professional 
evolution.”); Richards, supra note 12, at 73 (“Even into the 19th Century, physicians did not 
believe that they needed to communicate with their patients for the purpose of involving 
them in the decision-making process.”). 
 33. Joan H. Krause, Reconceptualizing Informed Consent in an Era of  Health Care 
Cost Containment, 85 IOWA L. REV. 261, 270 (1999) (“The first cases to address [informed 
consent] concerned consent only at its most basic level, i.e., whether the physician had the 
patient’s permission to perform a surgical procedure, or instead had committed battery by 
‘touching’ the patient without consent.”); Elizabeth Sudbury Langston, TORTS—Changes in 
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Mohr v. Williams,35 both decided in 1905, were among the first cases 
holding physicians liable to their patients for failing to obtain consent for 
the particular procedures performed,36 even though those procedures were 
arguably necessary and skillfully executed.37  In Pratt, the physician 
performed a hysterectomy on his patient, removing her uterus and ovaries, 
without her consent, to treat epilepsy.38  The physician argued that he 
should not be held liable for battery39 because, in his opinion, the surgery 
was “proper and essential to her welfare” and there was a “universal 
acquiescence of lay and professional minds in the principle that the 
employment of the physician or surgeon gives him implied license to do 
whatever in the exercise of his judgment may be necessary.”40  In Mohr, the 
physician had the patient’s consent to operate on her right ear, but after the 
patient was anesthetized, he reexamined her and made the decision to 
operate on her left ear instead.41  In that case, the physician similarly argued 
that he should not be held liable because “plaintiff’s left ear was in fact 
diseased, in a condition dangerous and threatening to her health, [and] the 
operation was necessary . . . .”42  In both of these cases, the courts rejected 
the physicians’ contentions that they were free to use their best judgment in 
deciding whether to perform surgery for the patients’ welfare and, instead, 
held them liable for battery based on the patients’ lack of consent to the 
                                                                                                                 
the Arkansas Law of Informed Consent: What’s Up Doc? Aronson v. Harriman, 321 Ark. 
359, 901 S.W.2d 832 (1995), 19 U. ARK. LITTLE ROCK L.J. 263, 271 (1997) (“The courts in 
these early battery cases held that a patient has a right to decide whether to undergo medical 
treatment; however, the courts did not consider whether the physician had given the patient 
adequate information to make an informed decision.”). 
 34. 118 Ill. App. 161 (1905).  
 35. 104 N.W. 12 (Minn. 1905). 
 36. Pratt, 118 Ill. App. at 166. 
 37. See id. at 166-68 (citing State v. Housekeeper, 16 A. 382 (Md. 1889)).  The court 
noted that, even before its decision, the law recognized that consent to an operation was 
necessary.  Pratt was, however, one of the first cases to hold the physician liable for failing 
to obtain that consent.  
 38. Id. at 168-72. 
 39. Id. at 181.  The court uses the term “trespass on the person of another” rather than 
battery, but the concepts are the same.   
 40. Id. at 166. 
 41. Mohr v. Williams, 104 N.W. 12, 13 (Minn. 1905).  
 42. Id. at 15. 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol64/iss4/8
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surgery.43  The language in both cases strongly supports the principle of 
patient self-determination.44 
In 1914, the New York Court of Appeals decided Schloendorff,45 which 
reconfirmed the holdings in Pratt and Mohr46 and is often credited as 
forming the foundation for informed consent.47  The court’s opinion 
contains Justice Benjamin Cardozo’s oft-quoted statement48 that “[e]very 
human being of adult years and sound mind has a right to determine what 
shall be done with his own body; and a surgeon who performs an operation 
without his patient’s consent commits an assault, for which he is liable in 
damages.”49  Soon after the decision in Schloendorff, the courts universally 
accepted the principle that a physician’s failure to obtain consent from a 
patient for the particular procedure performed subjects the physician to 
liability for battery.50  
The next major advance in informed consent law did not occur until 
1957.51  At that time, the legal focus changed from determining whether the 
patient consented to a particular medical procedure to whether the patient 
received enough information to make an intelligent decision.52  Advances in 
                                                                                                                 
 43. Pratt, 118 Ill. App. at 179-80; Mohr, 104 N.W. at 15. 
 44. See Shultz, supra note 18, at 224 (“[T]he right to be secure against unconsented 
touching is close to absolute. Application of battery doctrine to medical care thus establishes 
an uncompromising base-line of protection for patients’ self-determination.”). 
 45. Schloendorff v. Soc’y of N.Y. Hosps., 105 N.E. 92, 93 (N.Y. 1914) (finding that the 
physician performed surgery on a patient who consented to an examination under anesthesia 
but allegedly stated that “there must be no operation”).  
 46. Id.  
 47. Derek Kroft, Informed Consent: A Comparative Analysis, 6 J. INT’L L. & PRAC. 457, 
458 (1997) (“[Schloendorff] became the foundation of the doctrine of informed consent . . . .”). 
 48. Krause, supra note 33, at 270 (“Justice Cardozo’s opinion contains one of the most 
commonly quoted pronouncements on patient self-determination . . . .”); Warren, supra note 
13, at 927 (“Most discussions of medical informed consent begin with the famous 1914 
opinion by Associate Justice Benjamin Cardozo in Schloendorff v. Society of New York 
Hospitals.”).   
 49. Schloendorff, 105 N.E. at 93. 
 50. Richards, supra note 12, at 77 (“Following Schloendorff, it soon became universally 
accepted that any medical procedure involving the touching of a patient must be authorized 
or the physician had committed the tort of battery.”). 
 51. See Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trs., 317 P.2d 170, 181 (Cal. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1957). 
 52. William J. McNichols, Informed Consent Liability in a “Material Information” 
Jurisdiction: What Does the Future Portend?, 48 OKLA. L. REV. 711, 714 (1995) 
(“Beginning in the late 1950s, the first cases began to appear in which the courts allowed 
patients to recover tort damages when physicians wrongfully failed to disclose information 
about the risks involved in a proposed course of [medical] treatment.”); Kroft, supra note 47, 
Published by University of Oklahoma College of Law Digital Commons, 2012
704 OKLAHOMA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 64:697 
 
 
medicine during the decades following Schloendorff precipitated this 
change.  Treatments became more sophisticated, required additional 
physician training, and were increasingly difficult for patients to understand 
and assess.53  Because medical care was more complex, patients had to rely 
on their physicians to explain the risks, benefits, and alternatives of 
recommended procedures.54 
As the information asymmetry between patients and physicians 
increased, consent also took on a new meaning.55  Arguably, patients could 
intelligently consent to a medical procedure only if they understood the 
nature of the treatment and the risks and consequences entailed.56  Stated 
otherwise, the patient’s consent was not legally valid if the physician failed 
to disclose some essential information concerning a surgical procedure.57  
                                                                                                                 
at 459 (“Unlike previous decisions, Salgo was not only concerned with whether the patient 
consented, but whether the patient was properly informed.”). 
 53. Mariner, supra note 10, at 392 (“The growing complexity of postwar medical 
technology meant that the risks of treatment were no longer obvious to the laity.”).   
 54. Id. at 391 (“Until about the time of World War II, patients had little need for 
extensive explanation of the risks and benefits of medical treatment.  Judged by today’s 
standards, medical therapies were relatively straightforward, and the risks were often 
apparent to everyone.”).  Commentators have also cited other reasons for the expansion of 
the principle of informed consent.  See, e.g., Janet L. Dolgin, The Evolution of the 
“Patient”: Shifts in Attitudes About Consent, Genetic Information, and Commercialization 
in Health Care, 34 HOFSTRA L. REV. 137, 151 (2005)  (“In the years following Schloendorff, 
a variety of social and economic trends, including, in particular, the broad generalization of 
individualism within United States society after World War II, the development of expensive 
medical technology, new modes of access to information, articulation of an informed 
consent rule for application to research contexts, and the broad commercialization of health 
care, encouraged the widespread acceptance and expansion of the informed consent doctrine 
in clinical settings.”). 
 55. Richards, supra note 12, at 81 (“With physicians armed with more understanding 
about the causes and treatments of disease, courts began to examine the quantity of 
information they provided to patients and whether patients had been informed as to the risks, 
benefits, and available alternatives to the proposed medical treatments.”).   
 56. Mariner, supra note 10, at 392 (“Consent to treatment meant that the patient was 
willing to accept its consequences.  Yet only the physician knew the possible consequences 
of more sophisticated therapies.”); see also Schultz, supra note 18, at 232 (“The doctrine of 
informed consent . . . recognizes that one way that actionable physical injury may occur is 
through the failure to disclose information that would have resulted in non-consent to 
treatment.”). 
 57. George P. Smith, II, The Vagaries of Informed Consent, 1 IND. HEALTH L. REV. 109, 
111 (2004) (“We then insist that this consent be ‘informed,’ recognizing that if a patient 
readily agrees to something about which she understands little or about which she has a false 
understanding, we have somehow or other abrogated or sidestepped her autonomous 
decision-making rights.”) (quoting WILLARD GAYLIN & BRUCE JENNINGS, THE REVERSION OF 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol64/iss4/8
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In 1957, Salgo v. Leland Stanford Junior University Board of Trustees 
became the first significant case to explicitly extend the physician’s duty 
beyond acquiring bare consent to requiring consent based on adequate 
disclosure.58  In that case, the patient sued his physician for performing a 
diagnostic procedure without informing him of the small risk of paralysis.59  
In its decision, the court used the term “informed consent” for the first 
time60 and found that the physician “subjects himself to liability if he 
withholds any facts which are necessary to form the basis of an intelligent 
consent by the patient to the proposed treatment.”61  The court gave the 
physician considerable discretion regarding the application of this standard 
to a particular patient,62 but added that “the physician may not minimize the 
known dangers of a procedure . . . in order to induce his patient’s 
                                                                                                                 
AUTONOMY 159 (1996)); Paula Walter, The Doctrine of Informed Consent: To Inform or Not 
to Inform?, 71 ST. JOHN’S L. REV. 543, 557 (1997) (“With time, cases arose in which 
plaintiffs who gave consent to medical procedures later argued that their consent was 
defective because all risks were not fully disclosed.  The next logical argument to be 
advanced was that this defective consent, based as it was on incomplete information, was the 
legal equivalent of no consent.”).  
 58. Agatha Lambris, Comment, Informed Consent for All?  Not Quite!  A Comparison 
of Informed Consent in the United States and Japan, 17 TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J. 237, 242-
43 (2003) (“The most significant of the cases marking the transition from the older simple 
rule to the contemporary informed consent rule is Salgo v. Leland Stanford Junior University 
Board of Trustees in 1957.”); Ben Sones, Note, A Tale of Two Countries: Parallel Visions 
for Informed Consent in the United States and the United Kingdom, 39 VAND. J. 
TRANSNAT’L L.  253, 258 (2005) (“This judicial trend toward the ‘informing’ aspect of 
informed consent began with the famous California case of Salgo v. Leland Stanford Junior 
University Board of Trustees in 1957 . . . . [I]t was the first court to discuss what disclosures 
were necessary to make a patient’s consent informed . . . .”).  
 59. Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trs., 317 P.2d 170, 177 (Cal. Dist. Ct. 
App. 1957) (“[A]ll the witnesses agree that paralysis is a rare complication of [the 
procedure].”). 
 60. Krause, supra note 33, at 270 (“[I]t was not until [Salgo] that the phrase ‘informed 
consent’ appeared in a legal opinion.”). 
 61. Salgo, 317 P.2d at 181; Warren, supra note 13, at 930 (“Salgo established the 
modern view of informed consent, stating that the physician violates his duty to his patient if 
he fails to provide information necessary for the patient to form intelligent consent to the 
proposed treatment.”). 
 62. Salgo, 317 P.2d at 181; Langston, supra note 33, at 272 (“[Salgo] purported to 
require what is called ‘full disclosure’  but also left discretion in the physician regarding the 
meaning of this standard.”). 
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consent.”63  Since Salgo, all fifty states have required informed consent, 
either by statute or common law.64 
Under Salgo, the physician was liable for battery if the patient was not 
properly informed of the risks of surgery.65  Just three years later, in 1960, 
the doctrinal underpinning of informed consent began to shift from battery 
to negligence.66  The courts decided that characterizing informed consent as 
an intentional tort was not doctrinally sound67 and would lead to 
“widespread and unwarranted” judgments against physicians.68  Today, 
almost all informed consent actions are grounded in negligence,69 and 
battery is reserved for cases where the patient did not consent at all to the 
procedure actually carried out.70  
                                                                                                                 
 63. Salgo, 317 P.2d at 181. 
 64. Morris, supra note 11, at 315 n.11 (“In 2000, Georgia became the fiftieth state to 
accept the common law doctrine of informed consent.”); see Ketchup v. Howard, 543 S.E. 
2d 371, 381-86 (Ga. Ct. App. 2000). 
 65. McNichols, supra note 52, at 714 (explaining that the first cases establishing 
physician liability for failing to provide informed consent relied on a battery cause of 
action).  
 66. McNichols, supra note 51, at 715 (“In the early 1960s, almost immediately after 
they exposed physicians to liability for inadequate risk disclosure, the courts made an abrupt 
doctrinal about face [and moved from battery to a negligence cause of action].”); Richards, 
supra note 12, at 83 (“The first case to base informed consent liability on a negligence 
theory rather than a battery theory was the Kansas Supreme Court case of Natanson v. 
Kline,” 350 P.2d 1093 (Kan. 1960)).  
 67. Aaron D. Twerski & Neil B. Cohen, Informed Decision Making and the Law of 
Torts: The Myth of Justiciable Causation, 1988 U. ILL. L. REV. 607, 612 (“To say that a 
doctor who falls short of meeting a reasonableness standard [for disclosure] is thereby 
transformed into an intentional tort-feasor does not seem consistent with the traditional 
perception of an intentional tort.”).  
 68. McNichols, supra note 51, at 715 (“[The courts] sensed that the battery theory 
would subject the medical profession to widespread and unwarranted liability.”). 
 69. Barbara L. Atwell, The Modern Age of Informed Consent, 40 U. RICH. L. REV. 591, 
595 (2006) (“Today, the failure to obtain informed consent generally gives rise to a 
negligence claim rather than a battery cause of action.”); Krause, supra note 33, at 271 
(“Today informed consent actions sound almost exclusively in negligence . . . .”); Sones, 
supra note 58, at 258 (“The classification of the doctrine of informed consent under the 
heading of professional negligence is currently the dominant view, and the battery cause of 
action is typically reserved for situations where physicians act with no consent at all or with 
evil intent.” (footnotes omitted)). 
 70. Shultz, supra note 18, at 226 (“The modern allegation of battery typically arises 
when consent to a particular procedure is given and a different or additional procedure is 
carried out.”); see also Conklin v. Weisman, 678 A.2d 1060, 1069 (N.J. 1998) (“It is a 
battery if a physician operates without the patient’s consent; it is negligence if the physician 
operates without the patient’s informed consent.”); Robert Gatter, Informed Consent Law 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol64/iss4/8
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It made sense to hold physicians liable for battery when their only 
responsibility was to obtain consent from their patients for the procedures 
they performed.71 However, this doctrinal foundation made less sense when 
liability was based on failure to inform patients of the risks and alternatives 
to treatment.  Battery is based on nonconsensual touching,72 but deficient 
informed consent is generally premised on the physician’s failure to 
exercise due care in making disclosures to the patient.73  In informed 
consent cases, the physician has the patient’s consent to the particular 
procedure performed74 and is usually acting in good faith and with the 
patient’s best interests in mind.75  Because the informed consent cause of 
action is generally based on an unintentional failure to disclose information, 
rather than on intentional antisocial conduct by the physician,76 the conduct 
is more accurately characterized as negligence, rather than as an intentional 
tort.77   
                                                                                                                 
and the Forgotten Duty of Physician Inquiry, 31 LOY. U. CHI. L.J. 557, 562 (2000) 
(“[Battery] permits patients to sue for receiving medical treatments to which they did not 
consent.  This form of informed consent case is rare today, and it generally arises when a 
physician’s actions exceed the scope of the patient’s consent.” (footnotes omitted)).   
 71. Morris, supra note 11, at 319 (“When the operation was performed without any 
consent, the tort of battery was well-suited to protect the patient’s autonomy interest.”). 
 72. Langston, supra note 33, at 270 n.75 (“An intentional touching by a physician to 
which the patient has not consented is considered a battery.”); Smith, II, supra note 57, at 
115 (“[N]onconsensual touching was, and is, a legal battery.”). 
 73. See Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 8 (Cal. 1972) (“[T]he doctor in obtaining consent 
may have failed to meet his due care duty to disclose pertinent information.  In that situation 
the action should be pleaded in negligence.”). 
 74. See Natanson v. Kline, 350 P.2d 1093, 1100-01 (Kan. 1960) (“We are here 
concerned with a case where the patient consented to the treatment, but alleges . . . the risks 
of the treatment were not properly explained to her.  This relates directly to . . . informed 
consent . . . .”). 
 75. See Trogun v. Fruchtman, 207 N.W.2d 297, 313 (Wis. 1973) (“[P]hysicians are 
invariably acting in good faith and for the benefit of the patient.”); see also Natanson, 350 
P.2d at 1100. 
 76. See Natanson, 350 P.2d at 1100 (“The traditional assault and battery involves a 
defendant who is acting for the most part out of malice or in a manner generally considered 
as ‘antisocial’.”). 
 77. Trogun, 207 N.W.2d at 313 (“The failure to inform a patient is probably not, in the 
usual case, an intentional act and hence not within the traditional concept of intentional 
torts.”); Shultz, supra note 18, at 226 (“Discomfort with treating doctors under a doctrine 
aimed at antisocial conduct has prompted most jurisdictions to limit the battery action to 
those relatively unusual situations where a medical procedure has been carried out without 
any consent, rather than where the consent has merely been insufficiently informed.”); 
Walter, supra note 57, at 558 (“[A]ssault and battery are intentional torts and, as such, do not 
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The negligence cause of action also covers a broader spectrum of 
medical procedures than battery.  Because battery is premised on 
nonconsensual touching, it can easily be applied to invasive treatments, 
such as surgery.78  However, many treatments, such as prescriptions of oral 
medication, do not involve physical contact between the doctor and patient, 
yet patients also need adequate disclosure before agreeing to these 
treatments.79  For this additional reason, negligence is a better doctrinal 
foundation for informed consent.   
Courts were also concerned about physician liability in switching to a 
negligence cause of action.  Failure to meet informed consent requirements 
could theoretically expose physicians to significant damages for relatively 
minor omissions in the information disclosed.80  By moving from battery to 
negligence, the courts ameliorated the harshness of requiring informed 
consent by choosing a more physician-friendly cause of action.81  
Negligence helps protect physicians because it is more difficult to prove 
than battery and has additional defenses.82   
In order to recover on a battery claim, a patient need only prove that (1) 
the physician failed to give the required information regarding the surgery, 
and (2) the surgery was performed.83  The patient need not show that the 
                                                                                                                 
logically apply to situations where a doctor unintentionally fails to disclose adequate 
information.”). 
 78. Krause, supra note 33, at 310 (“The clearest legacy of the touching requirement is 
the restriction of informed consent actions in many states to surgical and other ‘invasive’ 
procedures.”); Morris, supra note 11, at 337 (“The tort of battery might require an invasive 
procedure, such as surgery, but the tort of negligence does not.”). 
 79. See Morris, supra note 11, at 320 (“[F]ailure to disclose is not conceptualized as 
contact or touching required for intentional tort liability to attach.”). 
 80. Shultz, supra note 18, at 225 (“Given the absolute nature of battery, . . . doctors 
could end up paying significant damages after providing faultless medical treatment, simply 
because some minor informational aspect of the consent process was questioned.”).  
 81. Krause, supra note 33, at 309 (“[B]attery generally is viewed as more favorable to 
patients, and the move from battery to negligence has been characterized as an attempt to 
protect physicians from liability for minor disclosure failures.”). 
 82. A battery cause of action would be better for physicians in only two respects.  First, 
battery generally has a shorter statute of limitations.  See McNichols, supra note 51, at 738. 
Second, negligence may cover a broader spectrum of cases than battery.  See Krause, supra 
note 33, at 310; Morris, supra note 11, at 337.  
 83. Cobbs v. Grant, 502 P.2d 1, 8 (Cal. 1972) (“[I]n a battery count . . . the patient must 
merely prove failure to give informed consent and a mere touching absent consent.”); 
Morris, supra note 11, at 336 (“All that the plaintiff would have to prove [in a battery case] 
is that the physician performed the procedure or operation without obtaining the patient’s 
consent and that the nonconsensual touching caused the plaintiff’s injury.”).  
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operation was negligently performed84 or that she suffered any harm.85  A 
battery theory would also deprive the physician of the many defenses that 
are available in a negligence case86 and, because battery is an intentional 
tort, it might expose the physician to liability for punitive damages.87  
Punitive damages might be especially burdensome to the physician because 
these damages are not always covered by malpractice insurance.88 
But the most important reason why the negligence cause of action is 
more favorable to physicians than battery rests on the causation element as 
it has been implemented by the courts and legislatures.  Most medical 
malpractice cases based on lack of informed consent are “rejected due to 
this one issue known as causation.”89   
II. Objective Causation 
To meet the causation element of informed consent, plaintiffs must prove 
both decision-causation and injury-causation.90  This two-part causation test 
                                                                                                                 
 84. Morris, supra note 11, at 319 (“[N]egligence in the operation itself [is not] required 
for the tort of battery . . . .”). 
 85. Id. (“Actual physical harm to the patient is not a prerequisite for tort liability; 
battery is a dignitary tort, protecting individuals from offensive as well as harmful 
contact.”); Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 790 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (“[N]egligence 
unrelated to injury is nonactionable.”). 
 86. Krause, supra note 33, at 309 (“[M]any defenses to negligence, such as an 
emergency situation or invocation of the therapeutic privilege, are unavailable to a physician 
charged with battery.”).  The most common defenses to a negligence action based on lack of 
informed consent include (1) an emergency situation, where it is impossible to get the 
patient’s consent; (2) waiver, where the patient waives the right to receive information; and 
(3) the therapeutic privilege, which allows the physician, in her discretion, to withhold 
information that might harm the patient.  Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 789 (explaining that the 
therapeutic privilege “must be carefully circumscribed, however, for otherwise it might 
devour the [informed consent] rule itself.”).  For a list of defenses to an informed consent 
claim sounding in negligence, see, for example, Peter H. Schuck, Rethinking Informed 
Consent, 103 YALE L.J. 899, 919 (1994); Gerald F. Tietz, Informed Consent in the 
Prescription Drug Context: The Special Case, 61 WASH. L. REV. 367, 412 n.262 (1986); 
Smith, II, supra note 57, at 118; Walter, supra note 57, at 555. 
 87. McNichols, supra note 51, at 715 (“[A]s an intentional tort, battery might have 
entitled the patient to an instruction on punitive damages . . . .”). 
 88. Cobbs, 502 P.2d at 8 (“[I]f [physicians are] held liable for the intentional tort of 
battery [they] might not be covered by . . . malpractice insurance.”); Morris, supra note 11, 
at 320. (“[T]he doctor’s malpractice insurance may not cover intentional misconduct.”).   
 89. Laura G. Tamaz, Informed Consent–The Message We May All Be Missing: How to Plead, 
Persuade, and Prevail in Informed Consent Cases, 1 Ann. 2004 ATLA-CLE 1331 (2004).  
 90. Gatter, supra note 70, at 562 n.36 (“The causation element has two sub-elements 
known as decision-causation and injury-causation.”); Richards, supra note 12, at 96 n.163 
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resulted from the shift by the courts from battery to negligence as the 
doctrinal underpinning of an informed consent cause of action. 
Failure to obtain informed consent began as a battery action based on the 
theory that a patient could not validly consent to a medical procedure unless 
he had the information necessary to make an intelligent choice.91  
Performing a medical procedure without first giving the patient adequate 
information was, therefore, considered a nonconsensual touching.92   
When the courts switched to a negligence cause of action, the concept of 
consent did not fit neatly into the doctrinal framework.93  For negligence, 
the plaintiff must prove that the defendant’s breach of duty caused the 
plaintiff’s injury.94  The breach of duty was the physician’s failure to 
disclose sufficient information for the patient to make an informed choice.  
The only logical place to include some aspect of consent was within the 
causation element.95  The courts added this concept by requiring the 
                                                                                                                 
(“[There are] two links in the causal chain: first, that nondisclosure caused the patient to 
agree to a procedure which otherwise she would have declined (‘decision causation’); 
second, that the procedure actually caused the patient’s harm (‘injury causation’).”).  
 91. See Salgo v. Leland Stanford Jr. Univ. Bd. of Trs., 317 P.2d 170, 181 (Cal. Dist. Ct. 
App. (1957) (“A physician violates his duty to his patient and subjects himself to liability if 
he withholds any facts which are necessary to form the basis of an intelligent consent by the 
patient to the proposed treatment.”). 
 92. Langston, supra note 33, at 270 n.75 (“An intentional touching by a physician to 
which the patient has not consented is considered a battery.”); Smith, II, supra note 57, at 
115 (“[N]onconsensual touching was, and is, a legal battery.”).   
 93. DAN B. DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS 657 (W. Page Keeton ed., 5th ed. 1984) (”Even 
if the defendant breaches his duty to disclose information . . . he is not subject to liability 
unless [the plaintiff] would have rejected the operation had full information been provided.  
[T]his rule is a concomitant of the decision to treat the claim as one for negligence rather 
than one for battery.”); Krause, supra note 33, at 309 (“Informed consent law originated in 
the intentional tort of battery . . . .”). 
 94. Scott v. Bradford, 606 P.2d 554, 557 (Okla. 1980) (“[I]f the physician obtains a 
patient’s consent but has breached his duty to inform, the patient has a cause of action 
sounding in negligence for failure to inform the patient of his options, regardless of the due 
care exercised at treatment, assuming there is injury.”); Tietz, supra note 86, at 372 
(“However, even when a breach [of duty] occurs, patients must demonstrate that the failure 
to inform proximately caused their injuries.”). 
 95. See Bradford, 606 P.2d at 558-59 (“Decisions discussing informed consent have . . . 
paid scant attention to the consent element . . . although this is the root of causation.”); 
Morris, supra note 11, at 324 n.59 (“The question of whether the patient would have 
consented to or rejected the proposed operation if the undisclosed information had been 
revealed involves a consideration of causation.”); Shultz, supra note 18, at 250 (“[W]here 
physical well-being is the protected interest, choice is placed in the role of factual cause, 
linking breaches of duty to the occurrence of harm.”).   
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plaintiff to show that the physician’s breach of duty caused the patient to 
consent to the procedure when he otherwise would have refused.96  This 
causation requirement is known as decision-causation.97 
Decision-causation only established that the physician’s breach of duty 
caused the patient to consent to the medical procedure, but it did not 
establish that the breach of duty caused any injury.98  Therefore, the courts 
added a second prong to the causation element.  The patient must show that 
(1) the breach of duty caused the patient to consent to a medical procedure 
that he otherwise would have refused,99 and (2) the medical procedure 
caused the patient harm.100  This second prong is called injury-causation.101  
To further protect physicians, the courts modified decision-causation by 
making it an objective test.102  To meet the decision-causation requirement, 
                                                                                                                 
 96. Alan J. Weisbard, Informed Consent: The Law’s Uneasy Compromise with Ethical 
Theory, 65 NEB. L. REV. 749, 758 (1986) (“The plaintiff must allege and prove that the 
physician violated a legally established duty to disclose a particular risk, that the undisclosed 
risk materialized in a physical injury, and that the failure to disclose ‘caused’ the patient to 
consent to a procedure which otherwise would have been rejected.”); Sones, supra note 58, 
at 261 (“The plaintiff must show that failure to obtain informed consent was a proximate 
cause of the injury or, stated differently, the patient would have decided not to undergo the 
treatment if the patient had been adequately informed of the risk.”).  
 97. Richards, supra note 12, at 96 n.163 (explaining that decision-causation is met when 
the plaintiff shows that the “nondisclosure caused the patient to agree to a procedure which 
otherwise she would have declined . . . .”).  
 98. McNichols, supra note 51, at 730 (“All states require a plaintiff who relies on lack 
of informed consent to establish a . . . causal connection between the negligent nondisclosure 
and the damage for which he seeks relief.”).   
 99. Gatter, supra note 70, at 562 n.36 (“To allege decision-causation, the patient must 
plead that the physician’s breach caused the patient to consent to treatment that the patient 
otherwise would have refused.”).  
 100. Id. (“To allege simple injury-causation, the patient must allege that an injury 
resulted from the treatment.”).   
 101. Twerski & Cohen, supra note 67, at 617 (“First, the nondisclosure must have caused 
the patient to agree to a procedure which otherwise would have been declined (decision 
causation); second, the procedure must have caused the patient’s harm (injury causation).”).  
 There are also issues concerning proof of injury in informed consent cases, which are 
beyond the scope of this article. For example, should an evaluation of damages include 
consideration of the risk of injury from the treatment plaintiff claims he would have chosen 
had adequate information been disclosed?  See Shultz, supra note 18, at 251. 
 102. Shultz, supra note 18, at 249 (“Medical cases potentially impose enormous liability.  
Fearing that patients’ testimony would be self-serving and biased by hindsight, courts have 
felt it necessary to [require plaintiffs to show] that, had the contested disclosure been made, 
a reasonable person would not have consented to the treatment.”); see also Walter, supra 
note 57, at 543 n.3 (noting that New York’s informed consent statute, which contains an 
objective causation standard, “was seen by many commentators as a necessary reaction to a 
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patients had to prove that the undisclosed information would have caused a 
reasonable person to refuse the medical treatment or procedure.103  Under 
this standard, the jury decides not what the particular plaintiff patient would 
have decided had he received the undisclosed information,104 but rather 
whether a hypothetical reasonable person would have withheld consent to 
the procedure had he been properly informed.105  Given this objective 
standard, a patient could be denied relief even if:  (1) the information he 
received from the physician was totally deficient, (2) the patient himself 
                                                                                                                 
trend in the development of case law that had become overly consumer friendly and 
exceedingly plaintiff oriented”). 
 103. Wilson v. Merritt, 48 Cal. Rptr. 3d 630, 641 (Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (“[C]ausation 
must be established by an objective test: that is, the plaintiff must show that reasonable 
‘prudent person[s]’ in the patient’s position would decline the procedure if they knew all 
significant perils.”); McNichols, supra note 51, at 730 (“[T]he Canterbury case, and 
virtually all other courts . . . have determined for practical and policy reasons that health care 
providers are entitled to the protection of an objective rule: a plaintiff can recover damages 
only if a reasonable patient would have refused treatment.”).   
 104. Some courts using the objective standard require the plaintiff to prove that both the 
plaintiff and a reasonable person would have refused the medical procedure had the required 
information been disclosed.  See, e.g., David E. Seidelson, Lack of Informed Consent in 
Medical Malpractice and Product Liability Cases: The Burden of Presenting Evidence, 14 
HOFSTRA L. REV. 621, 626 (1986) (noting that the D.C. Court of Appeals requires the 
plaintiff to demonstrate that “neither he nor a reasonable person in like circumstances would 
have consented”); see Henderson v. Milobsky, 595 F.2d 654 (D.C. Cir. 1978); Scott v. 
Bradford, 606 P.2d 554, 559 (Okla. 1980) (“If a plaintiff testifies he would have continued 
with the proposed treatment had he been adequately informed, the trial is over under either 
the subjective or objective approach . . . . The jury must be instructed that it must find 
plaintiff would have refused the treatment if he is to prevail.”).  Other courts require that the 
plaintiff show only that a reasonable person would have refused.  See, e.g., Fain v. Smith, 
479 So. 2d 1150, 1153 (Ala. 1985) (“If adequate disclosure could reasonably be expected to 
have caused that person to decline the treatment . . . causation is shown, but otherwise not.  
The patient’s testimony is relevant on that score of course but it would not threaten to 
dominate the findings.”); Morris, supra note 11, at 368 (“[C]ourts, in deciding the causation 
issue, generally do not consider whether the actual patient would have consented if he or she 
had received the required information, but only whether a reasonable patient would have 
consented.”); Seidelson, supra note 104, at 630 (“[I]f the jury finds that a reasonable person, 
adequately informed, would not have consented, plaintiff may recover whether or not the 
jury finds that the particular plaintiff would have withheld consent.”).  
 105. Morris, supra note 11, at 335 (“In all but a few states, causation is not measured by 
a true test of causation.  The law does not ask whether the actual patients would have 
consented if their doctors had not breached the disclosure duty, but rather, whether 
reasonable patients would have consented.” (footnotes omitted)). 
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would not have chosen the surgery if he had been informed of the risks and 
alternatives, and (3) he was severely injured.106 
Despite this inherent inequity, almost every state statute governing 
malpractice based on lack of informed consent uses an objective standard 
for determining causation.107  The remaining states—which either have no 
                                                                                                                 
 106. George J. Annas, Avoiding Malpractice Suits Through the Use of Informed Consent, 
Current Problems in Pediatrics, 6 CURRENT PROBS. IN PEDIATRICS 5, 8 (1976) (“[E]ven if 
this particular plaintiff would not have undergone the procedure had he been properly 
informed (because of his own beliefs, family experiences, fear of a certain complication, 
etc.), he cannot prevail unless a jury is convinced that a ‘reasonable person’ in his position 
would have made the same decision!”).   
 107. See FLA. STAT. § 766.103 (2010) (“No recovery shall be allowed in any court . . . in 
an action brought for [medical malpractice based on lack of] informed consent when . . . 
[t]he patient would reasonably, under all the surrounding circumstances, have undergone 
such treatment or procedure had he or she been advised by the physician . . . .”); GA. CODE 
ANN. § 31-9-6.1 (2010) (requiring that, in an action for informed consent, a patient must 
show that “a reasonably prudent patient would have refused the surgical or diagnostic 
procedure or would have chosen a practical alternative to such proposed surgical or 
diagnostic procedure if such information had been disclosed . . . .”); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 
40:1299.40 (2010) (“In a suit against a physician . . . involving a . . . medical malpractice 
claim which is based on the failure of the physician or other health care provider to disclose 
or adequately to disclose the risks and hazards involved in the medical care or surgical 
procedure rendered by the physician or other health care provider, the only theory on which 
recovery may be obtained is that of negligence in failing to disclose the risks or hazards that 
could have influenced a reasonable person in making a decision to give or withhold 
consent . . . .”); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2905 (2010) (“No recovery may be allowed 
against any physician, podiatrist, dentist or any health care provider upon the grounds that 
the health care treatment was rendered without the informed consent of the patient or the 
patient's spouse, parent, guardian, nearest relative or other person authorized to give consent 
for the patient when . . . [a] reasonable person, under all surrounding circumstances, would 
have undergone such treatment or procedure had that person been advised by the 
physician . . . .”); NEB. REV. STAT. § 44-2820 (2010) (“Before the plaintiff may recover any 
damages in any action based on failure to obtain informed consent, it shall be established by 
a preponderance of the evidence that a reasonably prudent person in the plaintiff’s position 
would not have undergone the treatment had he or she been properly informed and that the 
lack of informed consent was the proximate cause of the injury and damages claimed.”); 
N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-1116A (West 2010) (“A doctor who fails in [his or her] duty to 
communicate [alternatives for treatment or inherent and potential hazards] is liable for harm 
to the patient resulting from the [treatment or operation] if a reasonably prudent patient [or 
patient's representative] under similar circumstances would not have consented to the 
[treatment or operation] had [he or she] known of the [alternatives for treatment and inherent 
and potential hazards].”); N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2805-d (McKinney 2010) (requiring that 
in a medical malpractice action based on lack of informed consent, it must “be established 
that a reasonably prudent person in the patient’s position would not have undergone the 
treatment or diagnosis if he had been fully informed . . . .”); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 90-21.13 
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informed consent statute covering causation, or have a statute that appears 
to contain a subjective, rather than an objective, standard—almost 
universally have case law mandating the use of objective causation.108  
                                                                                                                 
(2010) (precluding recovery against healthcare provider where “[a] reasonable person, under 
all the surrounding circumstances, would have undergone such treatment or procedure had 
he been advised by the health care provider . . . .”); TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 
74.101 (West 2010) (“[T]he only theory on which recovery [for lack of informed consent] 
may be obtained is that of negligence in failing to disclose the risks or hazards that could 
have influenced a reasonable person in making a decision to give or withhold consent.”); 
UTAH CODE ANN. § 78B-3-406 (LexisNexis 2010) (requiring the patient to prove that “a 
reasonable, prudent person in the patient’s position would not have consented to the health 
care rendered after having been fully informed as to all facts relevant to the decision to give 
consent . . . .”); VT. STAT. ANN. 12 § 1909 (2010) (allowing as a defense to a malpractice 
action based on lack of informed consent that “a reasonably prudent person in the patient’s 
position would have undergone the treatment or diagnosis if he or she had been fully 
informed”); WASH. REV. CODE § 7.70.050 (2010) (requiring as a necessary element of proof 
in a negligence case based on lack of informed consent that “a reasonably prudent patient 
under similar circumstances would not have consented to the treatment if informed of such 
material fact . . . .”).   
 108. See Fain v. Smith, 479 So. 2d 1150, 1155 (Ala. 1985) (adopting an objective standard to 
determine causation in medical malpractice action based on failure to obtain informed consent, 
requiring “consideration by the factfinder of what a reasonable person with all of the 
characteristics of the plaintiff, including his idiosyncrasies and religious beliefs, would have 
done under the same circumstances.”); Marsingill v. O’Malley, 128 P.3d 151, 158 (Alaska 2006) 
(“[T]he second prong of the materiality test is for the trier of fact to decide whether the 
probability of that type of harm is a risk which a reasonable patient would consider in deciding 
on treatment.  The focus is on whether a reasonable person in the patient's position would attach 
significance to the specific risk.”); Shetter v. Rochelle, 409 P.2d 74, 83 (Ariz. 1965) (When 
determining causation in an informed consent case, the court considered the fact that “[t]he risks 
of injury are not so great as to cause most reasonable persons to decline to have [the] beneficial 
operation performed . . .” (citations omitted)); Haupt v. Kumar, 288 S.W.3d 704, 707 (Ark. 
2008) (adopting an objective standard for determining proximate cause in informed consent 
cases, meaning “causation is evaluated in terms of whether a reasonable and prudent patient in 
the plaintiff's position would have withheld consent to the treatment or procedure had the 
material risks been disclosed.” (citations omitted)); Wilson v. Merritt, 48 Cal. Rptr. 3d 630, 641 
(Cal. Ct. App. 2006) (requiring that in medical malpractice actions based on lack of informed 
consent, “causation must be established by an objective test:  that is, the plaintiff must show that 
reasonable ‘prudent person[s]’ in the patient’s position would decline the procedure if they knew 
all the significant perils”); Williams v. Boyle, 72 P.3d 392, 398 (Colo. 1993) (“To show lack of 
informed consent, a plaintiff must show . . . that a reasonable person would not have consented 
to the procedure if information had been given to the plaintiff . . . .”); Hammer v. Mount Sinai 
Hosp. 596 A.2d 1318, 1324-25 (Conn. 1991) (“Under the ‘objective’ standard . . . the question 
of causality is resolved ‘in terms of what a prudent person in the patient's position would have 
decided if suitably informed of all perils bearing significance.’ [Here, the court held] along with 
a majority of jurisdictions, that the objective test is the better standard” in an informed consent 
action); Spencer v. Goodill, C.A. No. 08C-06-183 RRC, 2009 WL 4652960, at *1 (Del. Dec. 4, 
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2009) (holding that Delaware “follows the objective standard . . . .  Plaintiff must prove that a 
hypothetical ‘reasonable person’ in similar circumstances . . . would not have consented to the 
[procedure] if properly informed of the risks”); Gordon v. Neviaser, 478 A.2d 292, 294 (D.C. 
1984) (requiring that “[t]he causality determination must be resolved under an objective, not a 
subjective standard. That is, the question is not what this particular patient would have done if 
there had been adequate disclosure, but what a reasonably prudent person in the patient's 
position would have done if adequately informed.”); Bernard v. Char, 903 P.2d 667, 675 (Haw. 
1995) (adopting the “objective standard [which] requires consideration by the factfinder of what 
a reasonable person with all of the characteristics of the plaintiff, including his idiosyncrasies 
and religious beliefs, would have done under the same circumstances”); Foster v. Traul, 175 
P.3d 186, 193 (Idaho 2007) (“[T]o prove causation [in an informed consent action the patient] 
must show by a preponderance of evidence that ‘a reasonable person would have chosen no 
treatment or a different course of treatment had he or she been adequately informed by the 
physician.’”) (citing Sherwood v. Carter, 805 P.2d 452, 465 (1991)); Schiff v. Friberg, 331 Ill. 
App. 3d 643, 657 (2002) (“[A] plaintiff must point to significant undisclosed information 
relating to the treatment which would have altered her decision to undergo it . . . . If the 
disclosure would not have changed the decision of a reasonable person in the position of the 
plaintiff, there is no causal connection between nondisclosure and her postoperative condition; 
if, however, disclosure would have caused a reasonable person in the position of the patient to 
refuse the surgery or therapy, a causal connection is shown. (citations omitted)”); Spar v. Cha, 
907 N.E.2d 974, 984 (Ind. 2009) (“A plaintiff alleging lack of informed consent must establish 
causation-in-fact, i.e., but for the physician's negligent nondisclosure, the patient—or a 
reasonable patient in the same or similar circumstances—would not have consented to the 
treatment in question.”); Kennis v. Mercy Hosp. Med. Ctr., 491 N.W.2d 161, 166 (Iowa 1992) 
(requiring a plaintiff to prove that “[d]isclosure of the risk would have led a reasonable patient in 
plaintiff’s position to reject the medical procedure or choose a different course of 
treatment . . . .”); Funke v. Fieldman, 512 P.2d 539, 550 (Kan. 1973) (determining that 
“[w]hether a patient would have refused treatment or a medical procedure had the physician 
made adequate disclosure is to be determined objectively.  If adequate disclosure could 
reasonably be expected to have caused the patient to decline the treatment or procedure because 
of revelation of the kind of risk or danger which resulted in her harm, causation is shown but 
otherwise not, and the patient's testimony is relevant on such issue, but should not be 
controlling[.]”); Sard v. Hardy, 379 A.2d 1014, 1025 (Md. 1977) (holding “that the causality 
requirement in cases applying the doctrine of informed consent is to be resolved by an objective 
test: whether a reasonable person in the patient's position would have withheld consent to the 
surgery or therapy had all material risks been disclosed”); Schroeder v. Lawrence, 359 N.E.2d 
1301, 1303 (Mass. 1977) (“Whatever the precise definition or scope of the surgeon's duty to 
provide information to the patient, the patient would be required to show, in order to connect any 
breach of duty to the ultimate injury, that, had the proper information been provided, he or she 
would have refused the operation; indeed one can well argue that the patient must go further and 
establish that in all the circumstances a reasonable person would have refused it.”); K.A.C. v. 
Benson, 527 N.W.2d 553, 561 (Minn. 1995) (“To prevail on a claim for negligent nondisclosure 
plaintiff must demonstrate that a reasonable person knowing of the risk would not have 
consented to treatment . . . .”); Reikes v. Martin, 471 So. 2d 385, 392 (Miss. 1985) (stating that 
to establish a causality, the test is “whether or not a reasonably prudent patient, fully advised of 
the material known risks, would have consented to the suggested treatment.”); Wilkerson v. 
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Only four states have statutes and/or case law that follow a subjective 
standard.109  Under this standard, the relevant decision-causation 
                                                                                                                 
Mid-Am. Cardiology, 908 S.W.2d 691, 696-97 (Mo. 1995) (“[T]he standard for determining 
lack of informed consent is whether a reasonable person in plaintiff's position would have 
consented to the procedure had the proper disclosure been made. If disclosure would not have 
changed the decision of a reasonable person in the position of the patient, then no causal 
connection exists between the nondisclosure and the damages.”); Smith v. Cotter, 810 P.2d 
1204, 1209 (Nev. 1991) (“The plaintiff's assertion that he or she would have refused the 
treatment must be reasonable under the circumstances.”); Canesi v. Wilson, 158 N.J. 490, 504-
05 (1999) (“In informed consent cases, proximate cause requires the plaintiff to prove that a 
reasonably prudent patient in the plaintiff's position would have declined to undergo the 
treatment if apprised of the risks that the defendant negligently failed to disclose.”); Koapke v. 
Herfendal, 660 N.W.2d 206, 212 (N.D. 2003) (“[A] plaintiff must also show that ‘reasonable 
persons, if properly informed, would have rejected the proposed treatment.’”) (citing DAN B. 
DOBBS, THE LAW OF TORTS § 250 (2000)); Nickell v. Gonzalez, 477 N.E.2d 1145, 1148 (Ohio 
1985) (requiring a plaintiff to establish that “a reasonable person in the position of the patient 
would have decided against the therapy had the material risks and dangers inherent and 
incidental to treatment been disclosed to him or her prior to the therapy”); Radinovic v. 
Abraham, 16 Pa. D. & C.3d 168, 178 (Com. Pl. 1980) (“In determining whether the patient 
would have submitted to the treatment, an objective, rather than subjective, test is applied.”) 
(citation omitted); Hook v. Rothstein, 316 S.E.2d 690, 705 (S.C. 1984) (“[A] causal connection 
exists between a physician’s failure to inform and the patient’s injury only if a reasonable person 
in the patient’s position would have refused the treatment had he or she been told of the risk that 
resulted in injury.”); Savold v. Johnson, 443 N.W.2d 656, 659 (S.D. 1989) (“[T]he proper 
rule . . . is whether a reasonable person in [the patient’s] position ‘would not have agreed to the 
proposed treatment if adequately apprised beforehand of the material risk which resulted in [the] 
injury.’” ); Hawk v. Chattanooga Orthopaedic Grp., P.C., 45 S.W.3d 24, 32 (Tenn. 2000) (“In 
[an informed consent] case, the issue of causation is based on an objective standard: ‘whether a 
reasonable person in the patient's position would have consented to the procedure or treatment in 
question if adequately informed of all significant perils.’” (citation omitted)); Adams v. El-Bash, 
338 S.E.2d 381, 386 (W. Va. 1985) ( “[A] causal relationship, between [the physician’s] failure 
to disclose information and damage to the patient, may be shown if a reasonable person in the 
patient’s circumstances would have refused to consent to the surgery had the risks been properly 
disclosed.”); Schreiber v. Physicians Ins. Co. of Wis., 588 N.W.2d 26, 33 (Wis. 1999) ( “The 
objective test [applies, which] focuses on what the attitudes and actions of the reasonable person 
in the position of the patient would have been rather than on what the attitudes and actions of the 
particular patient of the litigation actually were.  It asks two questions.  First, did the physician 
fail to give information that a reasonable patient would want to know?  Second, given the 
additional information, would the reasonable patient have acted differently than they did without 
the information?” (citations omitted)); Roybal v. Bell, 778 P.2d 108, 112-13 (Wyo. 1989) 
(holding that “the objective test . . . [is] the appropriate test for measuring causation in informed 
consent cases in Wyoming.”). 
 109. N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 507-E:2 (2010) (containing the following provisions: “(1) 
Whether the injured person or person giving consent on his behalf could reasonably be 
expected to know of the risks or hazards inherent in such treatment, procedure, or surgery; 
(2) Whether the injured person or the person giving consent on his behalf knew of the risks 
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determination is whether the particular plaintiff patient would have chosen 
the procedure had the appropriate information been disclosed;110 “whether 
an objectively reasonable person would have acted differently is 
irrelevant.”111 Kentucky and Michigan do not have statutes or case law 
governing the issue of causation in informed consent cases.112  Virginia’s 
courts have not decided the causation issue either, but the Fourth Circuit 
found that Virginia courts would apply the objective standard if the issue 
arose.113 
The fact that so many states have adopted objective causation is surprising 
for several reasons.  First, the reasonable person standard has been applied in 
traditional tort cases exclusively to determine breach of duty.114  It cannot 
logically be employed to determine whether the breach of duty caused the 
                                                                                                                 
or hazards inherent in such treatment, procedure, or surgery; (3) Whether the injured party 
would have undergone the treatment, procedure, or surgery regardless of the risk involved or 
whether he declined to be informed thereof . . . .); Wilkinson v. Vesey, 295 A.2d 676, 690 
(R.I. 1972) (using a subjective test for causation and finding that “the plaintiff must prove 
that if he had been informed of the material risk, he would not have consented to the 
procedure and that he had been injured as a result of submitting to the procedure”); Scott v. 
Bradford, 606 P.2d 554, 559 (Okla. 1979) (rejecting the objective causation standard, 
holding, “This basic right to know and decide is the reason for the full-disclosure rule.  
Accordingly, we decline to jeopardize this right by the imposition of a ‘reasonable man’ 
standard”); Mandell v. Maurer, 946 P.2d 706, 708 (Or. Ct. App. 1997) (“[W]hether a 
physician's failure to warn of the risks of treatment ‘causes’ a plaintiff's injuries or damages 
depends on whether the plaintiff would have consented to the treatment had he or she been 
informed of all the material risks and alternatives.  It is a subjective test of causation, and 
whether an objectively reasonable person would have acted differently is irrelevant.”).   
 110. Goodill, 2009 WL 4652960 at *1; Tietz, supra note 86, at 374-75 (“The objective-
patient standard fails to protect the right of ‘subjective’ patients to make their own 
therapeutic choices.”).  
 111. Mandell, 946 P.2d at 708. 
 112. 13 KY. PRAC. TORT LAW § 10:22 (2011) (“No Kentucky case addresses the 
causation issue.”); Howard v. Zamorano, No. 244610, 2004 WL 2314553, at *6 (Mich. Ct. 
App. 2004) (“Case law is silent with respect to whether a subjective or objective test [would 
be used to determine] whether plaintiff would have withheld consent and forgone surgery.”) 
 113. United States v. Cunningham, 683 F.2d 847, 849 (4th Cir. 1982) (noting that 
“[V]irginia courts have yet to consider the question” and concluding that “Virginia courts 
would apply the objective standard when confronted with such a case”). 
 114. Fain v. Smith, 479 So.2d 1150, 1162 (Ala. 1985) (Jones, J., dissenting) (“Traditional 
tort law, evolving over several centuries through the common law process and statutory 
enactments, relegates the application of the ‘reasonable person’ standard exclusively to the 
breach of duty determination.”).  
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plaintiff’s injury.115  As Dan Dobbs wrote, “if the full disclosure would have 
led the plaintiff to refuse the operation, both the defendant’s breach and its 
causal role is clearly established, so the [reasonable person requirement in the 
objective causation] rule does not reflect the causation requirement but 
imposes some additional and most unusual obstacle.”116 
More importantly, the foundational principle behind informed consent laws 
is autonomy,117 the personal right of patients to make informed decisions 
concerning their medical care.118  The right to autonomy is now “deeply 
entrenched in our culture and law”119 and is a “preeminent bioethical 
value.”120  The purpose of informed consent laws is to ensure that patient 
autonomy is respected—that the patient’s personal preferences, values, and 
goals are given deference121 and that the choice of medical care is ultimately 
the patient’s alone.122 
                                                                                                                 
 115. Id. at 1162-63 (“[The reasonable person standard] has no field of operation in 
measuring the requisite nexus between the defendant’s breach of duty and the cause of the 
claimant’s injuries.”). 
 116. DOBBS, supra note 93, at 657.  
 117. Honorable Armand Arabian, Informed Consent: From the Ambivalence of Arato to the 
Thunder of Thor, 10 ISSUES L. & MED. 261, 267 (1994) (“Of those interests guiding the doctrine 
of informed consent, the principle of personal autonomy must be considered preeminent.”); 
Sones, supra note 58, at 257 (“The doctrine of informed consent in the U.S. healthcare context 
holds as its driving value the concepts of autonomy and self-determination.”).  
 118. Atwell, supra note 69, at 594 (“Today, autonomy is the fundamental principle 
underlying medical decisionmaking. Competent adults exercise that autonomy by deciding 
whether or not to consent to medical treatment.”); Gatter, supra note 70, at 581 (“The doctrine of 
informed consent is founded on a principle of autonomy.  It is designed to give patients more 
control over their medical decisions and their bodies.”).  
 119. Schuck, supra note 86, at 924. 
 120. Roger B. Dworkin, Medical Law and Ethics in the Post-Autonomy Age, 68 IND. L. J. 
727, 727 (1993) (“Patient autonomy has long been the dominant rhetorical value in American 
medical law and medical ethics.”); Marshall B. Kapp, Patient Autonomy in the Age of 
Consumer-Driven Health Care: Informed Consent and Informed Choice, 28 J. LEGAL MED. 91, 
93 (2007) (“[I]n the United States, . . . autonomy is the preeminent bioethical value . . . .”); 
Krause, supra note 33, at 267 (“Informed consent is both a legal doctrine, embodied in state law, 
and an ethical doctrine, primarily reflecting the ethical principle of patient autonomy.”); 
Lambris, supra note 58, at 240 (“Informed consent [is] generally accepted to be a derivative of 
autonomy and [is] a deep-seated principle in Western ethics.”).   
 121. George J. Annas et al., The Empire of Death:  How Culture and Economics Affect 
Informed Consent in the U.S., the U.K., and Japan, 20 AM. J.L. & MED. 357, 364 (1994) 
(“Informed consent requirements implement the fundamental principle that ‘adults are entitled to 
accept or reject health care interventions on the basis of their own personal values and in 
furtherance of their own personal goals.’”); Donald T. Ridley, Informed Consent, Informed 
Refusal, Informed Choice—What Is It that Makes a Patient’s Medical Treatment Decisions 
Informed?, 20 MED. & L. 205, 207 (2001) (“In the context of the doctor/patient relationship, 
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Objective causation is “unfaithful” to these underlying ideals.123  The 
objective standard replaces the unique values of the individual patient 
concerning her medical care with those of a hypothetical prudent person.124  
In so doing, it negates the primary purpose of informed consent by failing 
to protect the autonomy rights of the individual patient.125  As the 
Oklahoma Supreme Court wrote in Scott v. Bradford:  “[t]o the extent the 
plaintiff, given an adequate disclosure, would have declined the proposed 
treatment, and a reasonable person in similar circumstances would have 
consented, a patient’s right of self determination is irrevocably lost.”126 
Not only does objective causation undermine the central purpose of 
informed consent, but it also makes the cause of action almost useless to a 
plaintiff patient.  Because juries must find objective causation for a patient 
to prevail, “few cases are litigated where informed consent is the sole 
allegation of negligence.”127 
                                                                                                                 
respect for the patient’s personal autonomy and bodily self-determination means the doctor’s 
respect for the patient’s personal values, goals, and sensibilities.”). 
 122. Eric M. Levine, Comment, The Constitutionality of a Court-Ordered Cesarean 
Surgery: A Threshold Question, 4 ALBANY L.J. SCI. & TECH. 229, 272 (“Recognition of the 
patient’s right to give informed consent demonstrates society’s respect for a patient’s autonomy 
and bodily integrity and more importantly, that the physician’s role is that of an adviser while the 
patient ultimately decides his course of treatment.”).  
 123. See Sones, supra note 58, at 262 (“[T]he objective test for causation is often 
criticized as being unfaithful to the underlying ideal of individual autonomy and self-
determination.”); Walter, supra note 57, at 572 (“[Objective causation] seems to undermine 
the very essence of the principle of patient self-determination.”). 
 124. Fain v. Smith, 479 So. 2d 1150, 1158 (Ala. 1985) (Jones, J., dissenting) (quoting 
Alexander M. Capron, Informed Consent in Catastrophic Disease Research and Treatment, 
123 U. PA. L. REV. 340, 420 (1974)) (“To adopt the ‘reasonable person’ standard would be 
to ‘deny the patient-subject with special ‘fears and hopes,’ or the religious beliefs of a 
Jehovah’s Witness, the right to make a decision.’”). 
 125. See BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW 334 (2d ed. 2000) (“European 
courts . . . are more protective of patient autonomy.  The German Federal Supreme Court has 
adopted a subjective test of causality, for example, with a heavy burden on the physician to 
show that the particular patient would have undergone the procedure even with the 
information . . . .”); Shultz, supra note 18, at 288 (“The projected decision of [the individual 
patient] rather than ‘a reasonable person,’ should provide the standard; any other standard 
fails to protect the very autonomy that lies at the heart of the [informed consent] interest.”); 
Walter, supra note 57, at 572  (“If the goal of the principle of autonomy is to grant the 
patient the right to guide his treatment, . . . then the court’s granting to the jury the ability to 
fall back on the concept of the ‘reasonably prudent person,’ who may consent to treatment 
despite the lack of appropriate information for the particular patient-plaintiff, effectively 
destroys the notion of choice.”). 
 126. Scott v. Bradford, 606 P.2d 554, 559 (Okla. 1979). 
 127. McNichols, supra note 51, at 731. 
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III. Objective Causation Renders Informed Consent an  
Almost Useless Claim 
Recovery premised only on informed consent is rare when the objective 
reasonable person causation standard is used.  The chart below 
demonstrates why this is true.  The line represents a hypothetical continuum 
of treatment-condition pairs, in other words, medical procedures for 
patients with specific medical problems.  The treatment-condition pairs 
have different risks and alternatives.  At the beginning of the line, 0% of 
patients would refuse the treatment for the paired medical condition if the 
risks and alternatives were known.  At the high end of the line, 100% of 



















If 100% of informed patients would refuse a medical treatment—a 
surgery, for example—the operation almost definitely involves substantial 
risks that could either be easily avoided or substantially reduced by using an 
alternative medical treatment.128  In these cases, it would be medical 
                                                                                                                 
 128. Shultz, supra note 18, at 229 (“[I]f the informed consent action involved 
nondisclosures that led to reasonably avoided and significant harms, it would seem to be 
largely duplicative of an action in professional negligence.”). 
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malpractice129 to perform or recommend the surgery, whether or not the 
patient gave her informed consent.130   
Even if a few patients would agree to the particular surgery knowing the 
risks and alternatives, juries are likely to find that the operation should not 
have been recommended or performed.  This is especially true if the patient 
suffers harm from the procedure because juries tend to be sympathetic to 
those who are injured.131  In the chart, this category of patients appears as 
80% or a higher percentage of informed patients would refuse treatment.  
Although 80% was selected somewhat arbitrarily, if only 20% or fewer 
patients would choose to have the surgery knowing the risks and 
alternatives, the operation is arguably not advisable.132  Because juries are 
likely to fully compensate these patients if they bring a medical malpractice 
action, there is no need for a duplicative informed consent claim.133 
At the low end of the continuum are treatment-condition pairs where few 
patients would refuse to have the medical procedure if fully informed of the 
risks and alternatives.  In the chart, this category of treatment-condition 
pairs is limited to those where 20% or a fewer percentage of informed 
patients would decline the procedure.  The treatments in this category are 
those where the patient has no real choice.  For example, a patient with a 
broken leg needs it to be set,134 a patient with a cancerous skin mole must 
                                                                                                                 
 129. Medical malpractice occurs “when a patient, as a direct result of a physician’s 
failure to render that level of care consistent with what would have been given by other 
practicing physicians in the community in question, is injured.”  Smith, II, supra note 57, at 
115. 
 130. Twerski & Cohen, supra note 67, at 643 (“On [one] extreme, in cases in which the 
omitted information clearly would have led this patient (or a reasonable patient) to decline 
the recommended procedure, the doctor’s recommendation of the procedure likely was 
malpractice.”). 
 131. Stephen G. Gilles, On Determining Negligence: Hand Formula Balancing, the 
Reasonable Person Standard and the Jury, 54 VAND. L. REV. 813, 837 n.86 (2001) (quoting 
Francis H. Bohlen, Mixed Questions of Law and Fact, 72 U. PA. L. REV. 111, 118 (1924)) 
(“The concept . . . that an injury should be paid for by him who causes it, irrespective of the 
moral or social quality of his conduct . . . still dominates the opinion of the sort of men who 
form the average jury.”). 
 132. See Twerski & Cohen, supra note 67, at 617 (“[W]e will give little consideration to 
cases in which it was a violation of minimum professional standards to perform or recommend 
the therapy or lack of therapy at all, whether the risks of the procedure were disclosed or not.  In 
those cases, malpractice doctrine should adequately compensate the patient.”). 
 133. Id. at 645 (“Egregious medical conduct can usually be remedied in a malpractice 
case in which an informed consent claim would be superfluous.”). 
 134. Gatter, supra note 70, at 592 (“[T]here is almost no risk of a grave consequence 
[where there is] a non-compound fracture of a bone. The patient has essentially no option 
other than to allow the fracture to heal . . . .”). 
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have it removed, and a patient who is seriously ill and has one clearly 
superior choice of treatment with few risks will generally choose that 
treatment.135  Under these circumstances, a patient who would not consent 
to the procedure is aberrational.136   
Some commentators argue that informed consent should not even be 
necessary in cases like these where the risks are remote and/or the 
alternatives are undesirable.137  Informed consent statutes are not intended 
to protect patients where there are no meaningful alternatives and so no 
viable choices for the patient to make.  In any event, it would be difficult to 
find an attorney who would take a case for patients in this condition-
treatment category on a contingent fee basis.  Even in a subjective causation 
jurisdiction, the jury would be unlikely to find a patient credible if he 
testified that he would have refused this category of treatment if he had 
additional information.138  
That leaves the treatment-condition pairs in the middle, where between 
20% and 80% of patients would choose not to have the treatment knowing 
the risks and alternatives.  In this category, there are genuine choices to be 
made and reasonable people will differ in their decisions depending on their 
values and personal preferences.139  In this category, informed consent 
matters;140 information is vital to help patients make the decisions that best 
                                                                                                                 
 135. Shultz, supra note 18, at 228 (“[A]lthough individualists will stress that in not 
disclosing all the facts the doctor has injured the patient’s dignity and integrity, [where the 
information that is undisclosed concerns a remote risk, the patient is seriously ill, and the 
surgery is the only viable treatment] many—perhaps most—will on these facts construe such 
an injury to be largely symbolic.”). 
 136. Id. (noting that “a patient who would not have consented to . . . surgery [where there 
was a remote risk, the patient was seriously ill, and the surgery was the only viable 
treatment] is aberrational”). 
 137. See, e.g., id. (“Where other important interests such as fairness to doctor-defendants 
or medical cost escalation are involved, it may plausibly be argued that such absolute 
protection need not be extended to the relatively less crucial disclosure of information about 
remote risks.”). 
 138. McNichols, supra note 51, at 731 (“Jurors may hear the court’s instruction that the 
question is what the individual plaintiff, not what a reasonable patient, would have done, but 
their instincts of fairness may well lead them to award compensation to a plaintiff only if 
they think he reasonably refused his doctor’s recommendation.”).  
 139. B.M. Dickens & R.J. Cook, Dimensions of Informed Consent to Treatment, 85 INT’L 
J. GYNECOLOGY & OBSTETRICS 309, 311 (2004) (“[P]atients exercise choice in the wider 
context of their perceptions, values, and intentions.”). 
 140. Id. at 310 (“[The role of informed consent] is to assist patients to satisfy their own 
wishes, even when their wishes do not advance their interests as their physicians perceive 
them.”). 
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meet their needs.141  But this is also the category where objective causation 
will cause the patient to lose an informed consent claim. 
To succeed on an informed consent claim, the patient must prove that a 
reasonable person knowing the risks and alternatives would not have 
chosen the condition-treatment option.142  However, the middle 20% to 
80% category, by definition, includes those types of treatments where 
reasonable patients will differ in their choices.  Therefore, in exactly those 
cases where individual choice and information matter most, patients could 
not prove that a reasonable informed person would refuse the treatment.143  
In this way, objective causation ensures that informed consent laws will not 
protect patients.144 
Wisconsin defines the reasonable person standard in terms of “what a 
statistical majority of persons would do,” rather than how an average or 
                                                                                                                 
 141. See Shultz, supra note 18, at 270 (“Because there is no certainty about who is right, 
the patient should receive information about divergent views and be allowed to arrive at her 
own decision.”). 
 142. Shultz, supra note 18, at 249; see also Walter, supra note 57, at 543 n.3. 
 143. See Gilles, supra note 131, at 815 (noting that pattern jury instructions typically 
advise juries to use a reasonable person standard, but do not explain how to actually apply 
that standard). Commentators have classified the reasonable person standard in various 
ways.  Some classify it as an aspirational standard—considering how the ideal person would 
act.  See, e.g., David A. Westenberg, Buckle Up or Pay: The Emerging Seat Belt Defense, 20 
SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 867, 907 (1986) (“The common law standard of reasonableness is an 
aspirational standard—how people ought to act.”).  Others characterize the reasonable 
person standard as requiring the jury to determine what an average member of the 
community would have done.  See Gilles, supra note 131, at 835 n.78 (“Terry argued that 
the issue of negligence turns on what ‘a standard man,’ not ‘an ideal or perfect man, but an 
ordinary member of the community,’ would have done under the circumstances.”).  Still 
others define reasonableness in terms of how a statistical majority of the population would 
behave.  See Heidi M. Hurd, The Deontology of Negligence, 76 B.U. L. REV. 249, 269 (1996) 
(“According to [the Wisconsin Supreme Court], reasonableness is defined by reference to 
what a statistical majority of persons would do.”); Leslie Gielow Jacobs, Adding Complexity 
to Confusion and Seeing the Light: Feminist Legal Insights and the Jurisprudence of the 
Religion Clauses, 7 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 137, 159 (1995) (“The function of the reasonable 
person standard is normative; it is designed in part to deter behavior that is perceived by a 
majority of the community to be unreasonable.”); see also Gilles, supra note 131, at 846 
n.110 (quoting LEARNED HAND, THE SPIRIT OF LIBERTY 105-06 (3d ed. 1960) (“What being 
careful means, it does not try to say; it leaves that to the judge, who happens in this case to 
be a jury of twelve persons, untrained in the law.”). 
 144. See Twerski & Cohen, supra note 67, at 619 (“[A] patient can prevail on an 
informed consent claim only if a reasonable patient, after being appropriately informed of 
the risks of a procedure which is safe enough to be reasonable to propose, would decline the 
procedure nonetheless.”). 
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ideal person would behave.145  Even in a jurisdiction with this definition of 
reasonableness, informed consent laws do not protect patients in the middle.  
Theoretically, if 51% to 80% of patients would refuse treatment knowing 
the risks and alternatives, the jury should find that a reasonable person—
defined as a majority of patients—would not choose the treatment.  
However, there are usually no statistics to help juries determine these 
percentages, so they are forced to make decisions based on their own 
experiences.146  Also, the statistical majority standard does not make sense 
in the context of informed consent laws designed to protect patient 
autonomy.  Patients have “the right to prefer a course of treatment that a 
majority of patients would not choose,”147 so, theoretically, a jury could 
find that a reasonable person would choose a reasonable treatment 
recommended by a physician, even if a majority of patients might not make 
the same choice.148  Because the middle category includes the types of 
treatments that are legitimate options for patients, attorneys would be 
reluctant to take any of these cases on a contingent fee basis.  As Barry 
Furrow wrote, “a jury is unlikely to find causation in these cases unless . . . 
the jury ignores its instructions and applies a subjective standard.”149 
Although patients will rarely prevail on an informed consent claim when 
objective causation is the standard, some patients will succeed in their 
claims.  As set forth above, patients are likely to succeed when 
recommending the treatment itself is medical malpractice such that a 
reasonable patient would not consent knowing the risks and alternatives.150  
But these claims would also succeed on a medical malpractice theory.151  
                                                                                                                 
 145. Hurd, supra note 143, at 269. 
 146. Gilles, supra note 131, at 835 n.78 (noting that juries draw data from common 
experience or their “knowledge of how an ordinary person would act”). 
 147. Krause, supra note 33, at 319 (quoting Jay Katz, Informed Consent—A Fairy Tale? 
Law’s Vision, 39 U. PITT. L. REV. 137, 164 (1977)) (“[T]he right to medical self-
determination is most important not where the patient’s treatment preferences coincide with 
the majority of patients, but where the patient seeks to make an atypical choice: ‘the very 
right at issue in cases of informed consent, the right of individual choice, may be precisely 
the right to prefer a course of treatment that a majority of patients would not choose.’”). 
 148. See Gilles, supra note 131, at 822 (“For as long as there has been a tort of 
negligence, American courts have defined negligence as conduct in which a reasonable man 
(nowadays, a reasonable person) would not have engaged.”). 
 149. FURROW ET AL., supra note 125, at 334. 
 150. See McNichols, supra note 51, at 732 (“[T]he informed consent cases likely to be 
litigated are those where there is a fair chance of showing that the defendant was negligent in 
some other way, as where the decision to perform the procedure was near the line of medical 
acceptability.”).  
 151. See supra Part II. 
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Some claims will succeed because juries occasionally apply their own 
standards of justice despite the objective causation standard.152  For this 
reason, informed consent is often included as a secondary cause of action—
a back-up claim—in a standard medical malpractice case.153  Despite these 
occasional successes, objective causation prevents informed consent claims 
from serving their main purpose—protecting the autonomy rights of 
patients.  As Jay Katz wrote, “[t]he law of informed consent is substantially 
mythic and fairy tale-like as far as advancing patients’ rights to self-
decisionmaking is concerned. . . .  The legal vision of informed consent 
based on self-determination is still largely a mirage.”154  
IV. Attempts to Interpret Objective Causation to Better Protect Patient 
Choice 
 Some courts and legislatures have added a subjective component to 
objective causation to enable juries to take the individual patient’s needs 
into account.  They include language such as a reasonable person “under 
similar circumstances,”155 or “in the patient’s position,”156 or “under all 
                                                                                                                 
 152. See M. F. Kraushar & James Steinberg, Informed Consent: Surrender or Salvation?, 
104 ARCHIVES OPHTHALMOLOLGY 352, 353 (1986) (“Juries have been known to apply their 
own standard of right and wrong, however, even if it is in contravention of the letter of the 
law, and base their decision on what they believe the specific patient-plaintiff would have 
done.”); see also Tamaz, supra note 89, at 1331 (advising attorneys to “[p]ersuade your jury 
by arguing informed consent is empowerment of the patient” and “let the jurors know they 
too have the right to choose”). 
 153. Christopher G. Kiss et al., Informed Consent and Decision Making by Cataract 
Patients, 122 ARCHIVES OPHTHALMOLOGY 94, 94 (2004) (footnotes omitted) (“[L]ack of 
informed consent is used as a secondary cause in more than 90% of all ophthalmologic 
malpractice cases.  In contrast, it is the primary reason in only 5% to 6% of claims.”); 
McNichols, supra note 51, at 731 (“[M]ost plaintiffs will use the informed consent doctrine 
as a backup alternative to their attempts to show that the physician was negligent in some 
manner in regard to the procedure itself.”); Weisbard, supra note 96, at 755 (“[I]nformed 
consent claims are often ‘tacked on’ to malpractice cases.”). 
 154. JAY KATZ, THE SILENT WORLD OF DOCTOR AND PATIENT 83-84 (2002); see also 
Mariner, supra note 10, at 405 n.50 (“[W]hile many judicial opinions are eloquent in 
describing a patient’s right of self-determination, most of the rhetoric remains dictum.”); 
Weisbard, supra note 96, at 751 (“[T]he law has been far richer in its rhetorical devotion to 
the ideal of patient self-determination than in its provision of effective legal redress to 
victimized patients.”). 
 155. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 13-1116A (West 2010) (“[A] reasonably prudent patient . . . 
under similar circumstances would not have consented to the [treatment] . . . .”). 
 156. N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2805-d(3) (Consol. 2011) (“[A] reasonably prudent 
person in the patient’s position would not have undergone the treatment . . . . “). 
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[the] surrounding circumstances.”157  This language appears to open the 
door to patients to submit evidence about their individual treatment goals.  
For example, a patient might want another child and therefore her choice of 
treatment may be affected differently than most patients by a physician’s 
failure to disclose information.  A patient with cancer may prefer a shorter, 
higher quality life, rather than the longest life possible.158  This preference 
may also determine the effect of a physician’s omitted disclosure on the 
patient’s treatment choice.  Including subjective language like “under 
similar circumstances” should theoretically allow juries to decide informed 
consent claims on a case-by-case basis, taking subjective desires such as 
these into consideration.159   
But this language has not solved the problem of protecting individual 
choice.160  “Under all the surrounding circumstances” and similar language 
have generally been interpreted by the courts to apply only to the patient’s 
medical condition, not to the patient’s non-medical values and 
preferences.161  To deal with this limitation, at least three states have 
formulated the objective causation standard to broadly include “a 
                                                                                                                 
 157. ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 24, § 2905(C) (2010) (“[A] reasonable person, under all 
surrounding circumstances, would have undergone such treatment or procedure . . . .”). 
 158. See, e.g., Gatter, supra note 70, at 568 (“[A] physician may disclose the same 
information to every patient with colon cancer even if one patient’s primary goal is to 
participate in his daughter’s wedding rather than to maximize his chances for a cure.”). 
 159. Spencer v. Goodill, No. 08C-06-183, 2009 WL 4652960, at *10 (Del. Super. Ct. 
Dec. 4, 2009) (quoting FAY A. ROZOVSKY, CONSENT TO TREATMENT § 1.13.4, at 62-63 
(1984) (“Causation in Negligent Consent”)) (“What a reasonable person would agree to 
depends in large measure on the facts and surrounding circumstances of an individual case.  
The standard reflects the view that obtaining consent must be accomplished on a case-by-
case basis, taking into account the peculiar needs and concerns of each patient.”). 
 160. See Weisbard, supra note 96, at 760 n.26 (“The court’s unelaborated references to 
reasonable or prudent persons ‘in the patient’s position’ may allow some theoretical leeway 
for greater individualization within the confines of a formally ‘objective’ test.  Thus far, it 
appears that few if any courts have accepted this invitation . . . .”). 
 161. Gatter, supra note 70, at 563 (“[The] duty to assess and account for subjective 
characteristics of patients is interpreted by the majority of courts to require only that 
physicians account for each patient’s medical condition in the course of informing patients 
about their treatment options.”); see, e.g., Spencer, 2009 WL 4652960, at *10 (“The jury 
may consider factors such as the patient’s ‘medical condition, age, risk factors, etc...’ to 
come to a determination of whether a reasonable person in the decedent’s condition would 
have undergone the medical treatment.”).  Note that all the factors referenced by the court in 
Spencer relate to the patient’s medical condition, rather than the patient’s values or 
idiosyncrasies.   
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reasonable person with all of the characteristics of the plaintiff, including 
his idiosyncrasies and religious beliefs.”162 
But even in the few states using this broad standard, that language has 
generally failed to protect patient autonomy.  Although the language 
instructs the courts to interpret the reasonable person standard to include the 
unique and idiosyncratic needs of individual patients, courts have usually 
declined to do so, “making the [ ] language appear like hollow rhetoric.”163 
In any event, if the courts actually followed this standard, they would 
essentially be using a subjective causation standard.  As Justice Adams of 
the Alabama Supreme Court wrote in his dissenting opinion in Fain v. 
Smith, “[w]hen we build into the [reasonable person] standard . . . ‘all of the 
characteristics of the plaintiff, including his idiosyncrasies and religious 
beliefs,’ we no longer have [a] reasonable person standard.”164  The 
standard is subjective165 and, to avoid confusion and ensure that the 
subjective standard is properly implemented, the courts should call it what 
it is.166 
                                                                                                                 
 162. See Fain v. Smith, 479 So. 2d 1150, 1155 (Ala. 1985) (per curium) (requiring 
“consideration by the factfinder of what a reasonable person with all of the characteristics of 
the plaintiff, including his idiosyncrasies and religious beliefs, would have done under the 
same circumstances”); Bernard v. Char, 903 P.2d 667, 675 (Haw. 1995) (adopting the 
standard set out in Fain, which requires the jury to examine whether a reasonable person 
with the patient’s characteristics would have consented to the treatment); Ashe v. Radiation 
Oncology Assocs., 9 S.W.3d 119, 124 (Tenn. 1999) (“[T]he finder of fact may also take into 
account the characteristics of the plaintiff including the plaintiff’s idiosyncrasies, fears, age, 
medical condition, and religious beliefs.”).   
 163. Gatter, supra note 70, at 569 (“Most courts, however, have applied the law much 
differently, making the [‘including his idiosyncrasies and religious beliefs’] language sound 
like hollow rhetoric. . . . [C]ourts [generally] do not impose any obligation on physicians to 
inquire into patient’s treatment goals . . . .”). 
 164. Fain, 479 So. 2d at 1164 (Adams, J., dissenting); see also MARK A. HALL ET AL., 
MEDICAL LIABILITY AND TREATMENT RELATIONSHIPS 216 (Aspen 2d ed. 2008) (questioning 
whether taking the plaintiff’s “idiosyncrasies, fears, age, medical condition, and religious 
beliefs” into account in the reasonable person objective causation standard makes it 
“dissolve into a subjective standard”). 
 165. McNichols, supra note 51, at 717 n.36 (“[Alabama] . . . arrives at a subjective 
standard by building the plaintiff’s idiosyncrasies into the profile of the reasonable person.”). 
 166. Not all courts would agree with this analysis.  See, e.g., Bernard, 903 P.2d at 675 
(“[V]iewing [objective causation] from a core of reasonableness establishes an initially 
uniform standard among cases from which adjustments for idiosyncrasies may be made.  
Under this rationale, the analytical exercise is grounded in objective reasonableness, but the 
standard may still flexibly accommodate the individual characteristics of each patient.”); see 
also Ashe, 9 S.W.3d at 124 (same).  While advocating for objective causation, these two 
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V. The Courts’ Justification for the Objective Causation Standard 
If objective causation undermines the purpose of informed consent laws, 
how do the courts justify using it?  Essentially, the courts focus on the 
problems with subjective causation and, in this way, attempt to show that 
objective causation is a better approach.  They posit that subjective 
causation would be based solely on the plaintiff’s testimony,167 and that 
testimony would be unreliable due to its speculative nature, hindsight, 
bitterness, and bias.168 
If the causation standard was subjective, the plaintiff would introduce 
testimony about the medical decision he would have made if the physician 
disclosed information that he did not disclose.169  Stated otherwise, the 
plaintiff would give “a speculative answer to a hypothetical question”:170  
“[W]ould [he] have decided differently [knowing] something he did not 
know?”171  Some courts have found this testimony to have “so much 
uncertainty that its credibility is minimal.”172 
                                                                                                                 
cases appear to acknowledge that the standard becomes subjective when the individual 
idiosyncrasies of the patient are taken into account. 
 167. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 791 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (“[Subjective causation] 
calls for a subjective determination solely on [the] testimony of a patient-witness . . . .”); 
Shultz, supra note 18, at 251 (noting that “the very existence of any injury would seem to 
turn solely on the rather shaky reed of the plaintiff’s hindsight testimony”); Weisbard, supra 
note 96, at 761 n.30 (noting that in McPherson v. Ellis, 287 S.E.2d 892, 896 (N.C. 1982), the 
court “expressed concern that the only evidence usually available [to prove subjective 
causation] is the plaintiff’s bald assertion, tempered by hindsight, as to what he would have 
done had he known all the facts”).   
 168. Schuck, supra note 86, at 919 (“The plaintiff patient’s testimony on decision 
causation . . . is likely to be biased, offered with the clarity of hindsight, and influenced by 
the adverse outcome that in fact occurred.”); Shultz, supra note 18, at 249 (“Fearing that 
patients’ testimony would be self-serving and biased by hindsight, courts have felt it 
necessary to [use objective causation].”); Sones, supra note 58, at 262 (“[A]n objective test 
neutralizes the effects of the plaintiff’s testimony regarding causation, which is likely tainted 
with self interest and ‘20/20 hindsight.’”).   
 169. Ashe, 9 S.W.3d at 123 (“The objective approach circumvents the need to place the 
fact-finder in a position of deciding whether a speculative and perhaps emotional answer to a 
purely hypothetical question shall dictate the outcome of the litigation.”). 
 170. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 791. 
 171. Id. (“Viewed from the point at which he had to decide, would the patient have 
decided differently had he known something he did not know?”). 
 172. Roybal v. Bell, 778 P.2d 108, 117 (Wyo. 1989) (Urbigkit, J., dissenting) 
(“Unquestionably, the legal system’s insistence on determining the hypothetical results of a 
hypothetical decision-making process incorporates so much uncertainty that its credibility is 
minimal.”); see also Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 790 (“[T]he question whether he actually 
would have turned the treatment down if he had known the risks is purely 
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The credibility of the patient’s testimony is further tainted by bitterness 
and self-interest.  The patient’s reconstruction of what he would have 
chosen given the omitted information will be “shadowed by the occurrence 
of the undisclosed risk.”173  Even if the risk of harm was remote, it will 
appear significant “after the uncommunicated hazard has in fact 
materialized”174 and the patient has suffered injury.175  The plaintiff patient 
also has a significant interest in deciding that the undisclosed information 
would have affected his treatment choice, especially when a substantial 
financial recovery rests on his answer.176  As the D.C. Circuit concluded in 
Canterbury v. Spence, relying on the subjective standard “places the 
physician in jeopardy of the patient’s hindsight and bitterness.”177   
Some courts also contend that subjective causation would preclude 
recovery if the patient died prior to trial.178  After death, the plaintiff 
                                                                                                                 
hypothetical . . . .”); Fain v. Smith, 479 So. 2d 1150, 1152 (Ala. 1985) (per curium) 
(“Because any answer to the hypothetical question—‘What would the patient in fact have 
done?’—can only be a guess, posing the causation issue in that form does not promote [a] 
rational resolution of it.”); Bernard v. Char, 903 P.2d 667, 673 (Haw. 1995) (“[The] 
causation question is necessarily conjectural, in that no one, including the patient, much less 
the factfinder, can provide a definitive answer regarding what decision the plaintiff-patient 
would have made with respect to undergoing treatment . . . .”). 
 173. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 790. 
 174. Id. (explaining that the patient’s answer to what he would have done had he been 
properly informed “hardly represents more than a guess, perhaps tinged by the circumstance 
that the uncommunicated hazard has in fact materialized”); Cobbs v. Grant, 104 Cal. Rptr. 
505, 515 (Ct. App. 1972) (“Since at the time of trial the uncommunicated hazard has 
materialized, it would be surprising if the patient-plaintiff did not claim that had he been 
informed of the dangers he would have declined treatment.”).  
 175. Ashe v. Radiation Oncology Assocs., 9 S.W.3d 119, 122 (Tenn. 1999) (“Opponents 
[of subjective causation] focus on the unfairness of allowing the issue of causation to turn on 
the credibility of the hindsight of a person seeking recovery after experiencing a most 
undesirable result.”); Weisbard, supra note 96, at 755 (“However remote a given risk 
appeared in prospect, hindsight demonstrates that it was sufficiently ‘real’ that it could result 
in serious injury—as it did in the very case.”). 
 176. Weisbard, supra note 96, at 758 (“Answers to such speculative questions 
[concerning whether plaintiff would have consented knowing the risks] might well tend to 
be self-serving, particularly when the potential for substantial financial recovery rides on the 
answer.”). 
 177. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 790-91. 
 178. See, e.g., Ashe, 9 S.W.3d at 122 (“[T]he adoption of a subjective standard could 
preclude recovery in an informed consent case in which the patient died as a result of an 
unforewarned collateral consequence.”); Roybal v. Bell, 778 P.2d 108, 112 (Wyo. 1989) 
(“[The subjective] test has been criticized because . . . this test would probably preclude 
recovery if the patient had died as a result of the treatment received.”). 
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obviously could not testify as to what he would have decided if the omitted 
information had been disclosed.179  
For these reasons, the courts generally prefer objective causation, relying 
on what a hypothetical reasonable person in the plaintiff’s position would 
have decided if suitably informed.180  As will be shown, while these reasons 
have some merit, they do not justify “backtracking on the law’s protection 
of self-determination.”181 
VI. The Arguments Against Subjective Causation Do Not Justify Adopting 
an Objective Standard 
The reasons for using objective, rather than subjective, causation rest 
mainly on the credibility of the plaintiff’s testimony and concern that the 
jury will uncritically rest its decision on that testimony alone.  But juries are 
regularly asked to determine the credibility of witnesses, and the testimony 
of witnesses other than the plaintiff could be used to test the veracity of the 
plaintiff’s statements.  The jury system has built-in protections to deal with 
just these concerns. 
Issues of hindsight, bitterness, and bias are common during jury trials.182  
To deal with these credibility issues, counsel for the defendant can 
demonstrate through cross-examination that the plaintiff’s statements are 
not trustworthy.  During summation, counsel can also suggest to the jury 
that the plaintiff’s testimony be evaluated “with suspicion,” especially if the 
plaintiff’s behavior deviates too much “from common experience without 
adequate explanation.”183  Counsel can further stress that self-interest is a 
                                                                                                                 
 179. See Fain v. Smith, 479 So. 2d 1150, 1155 (Ala. 1985) (per curium). 
 180. Schuck, supra note 86, at 919 (explaining that objective causation involves “what 
treatment decision . . . a prudent person in the plaintiff’s position [would] have made ‘if 
suitably informed of all perils bearing significance’”). 
 181. McNichols, supra note 51, at 730 (“Protecting physicians from the vagaries of 
subjective hindsight decision making is no excuse for backtracking on the law’s protection 
of self-determination.”); Weisbard, supra note 96, at 760 (“The impact of adopting 
[objective causation] is to replace an approach based on the needs and values of the 
particular patient . . . with the needs of hypothetical reasonable or prudent patients.”).   
 182. Jay Katz, Informed Consent-A Fairy Tale? Law’s Vision, 39 U. PITT. L. REV. 137, 
164 (1977) (“Questions of the influence of hindsight and bitterness are familiar to juries, as 
is the problem of self-serving testimony generally.”); Morris, supra note 11, at 332 (“[I]n 
any civil case, juries are called upon to evaluate the credibility of every witness who 
testifies.”).  
 183. Fain, 479 So. 2d at 1160 (Jones, J., dissenting) (quoting Alexander Morgan Capron, 
Informed Consent in Catastrophic Disease Research and Treatment, 123 U. PA. L. REV. 340, 
420 (1974)) (“The danger that a physician-defendant will be unfairly prejudiced by the 
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critical factor in assessing credibility and determining the weight that 
plaintiff’s testimony should be accorded.184  The court will probably 
reinforce this message by instructing the jury to consider the plaintiff’s bias 
in making its credibility determinations.185  Juries are familiar with human 
nature and capable of making these assessments.186 
The courts are also concerned with the hypothetical nature of the 
plaintiff’s testimony if a subjective causation standard is used.  However, 
under an objective standard, the jury would have to consider an even more 
difficult hypothetical.  For subjective causation, the individual plaintiff has 
to speculate about what she would have decided knowing the undisclosed 
information.  For objective causation, the jury must decide the still more 
speculative issue of what a reasonable person would have decided had the 
appropriate information been disclosed.187  Thus, the speculative nature of 
subjective causation alone does not justify adopting the objective standard.  
The courts’ concern, therefore, is not simply the hypothetical nature of 
the plaintiff’s testimony, but the belief that this speculative testimony will 
be the sole evidence on subjective causation submitted to the jury.188  By 
                                                                                                                 
patient-plaintiff’s testimony is slight.  It can be minimized through cross-examination and 
through defense counsel’s perfectly legitimate suggestion in argument to the jury that the 
patient’s statements be received with suspicion if they deviate too greatly from common 
experience without adequate explanation.”). 
 184. Id. (quoting David E. Seidelson, Medical Malpractice: Informed Consent Cases in 
“Full Disclosure” Jurisdictions, 14 DUQ. L. REV. 309, 330-31 (1976)) (“[C]ounsel for the 
defendant, in summation, will underscore that self-interest is a critical factor to be 
considered by the jury in determining the credibility to be extended [to] the plaintiff and the 
weight to be given his testimony.”).   
 185. Id. (quoting David E. Seidelson, Medical Malpractice: Informed Consent Cases in 
“Full Disclosure” Jurisdictions, 14 DUQ. L. REV. 309, 330-31 (1976)) (“[A]n instruction 
[will probably be given by] the court to the jury [in a subjective causation case] to take self-
interest into account in determining matters of credibility and weight.”).   
 186. Id. (“To accept [the argument that the doctor is in jeopardy under a subjective 
causation standard] is to accept implicitly the idea that juries are devoid of any 
understanding of human nature.”).  
 187. Id. at 1159 (“If there is no one reasonable person, each juror is left with subjectively 
determining what he or she would have done . . . .”); Richard A. Heinemann, Pushing the 
Limits of Informed Consent: Johnson v. Kokemoor and Physician-Specific Disclosure, 1997 
WIS. L. REV. 1079, 1084 (“[I]t is virtually impossible to determine what a hypothetical, 
‘reasonable’ patient would have done in similar circumstances.”). 
 188. See, e.g., Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 791 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (“[Subjective 
causation] calls for a subjective determination solely on the testimony of a patient-witness 
shadowed by the occurrence of the undisclosed risk.”); Fain, 479 So. 2d at 1152 (“The 
plaintiffs urge us to adopt the minority subjective standard, by which causation is established 
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contrast, with objective causation, the jury could determine what a 
reasonable person would have decided knowing the risks and alternatives 
by relying not only on the plaintiff’s testimony concerning the choice she 
would have made,189 but also on the physician’s and other experts’ 
testimony about what a reasonable person would have decided. 
To deal with this concern, both of the dissenting justices in Fain v. Smith 
suggested that physician testimony also be introduced in subjective 
causation cases to determine “what a reasonable patient under the same or 
similar circumstances would have done.”190  This testimony would be used 
by the jury to determine if the plaintiff’s behavior deviates too much “from 
common experience without adequate explanation.”191  If the courts 
followed this suggestion, the jury’s determination would not rest on the 
plaintiff’s testimony alone.192 
The credibility of the plaintiff’s testimony could also be measured by 
evidence concerning values and inclinations.  Patients make decisions 
concerning their medical care based not only on medical criteria, but also 
on their individual beliefs and preferences.193  If decisions were purely 
medical, physicians would be better equipped than patients to make 
them.194  The patient’s values and preferences are often subject to proof; 
                                                                                                                 
solely by the testimony of the plaintiff that he would not have consented to the procedure 
had he been advised of the particular risk in question.”). 
 189. Roybal v. Bell, 778 P.2d 108, 112 (Wyo. 1989) (“Under the objective test, the 
patient’s hindsight testimony is relevant but not controlling.”). 
 190. Fain, 479 So. 2d at 1164 (Adams, J., dissenting) (“The plaintiff’s testimony [under 
subjective causation] should not be conclusive and should be tested by testimony offered by 
the doctor as to what a reasonable patient under the same or similar circumstances would 
have done.”); id. at 1163 n.7 (Jones, J., dissenting) (“[Under subjective causation] a 
defendant [would not be] barred from showing what a reasonable person would or would not 
do under similar circumstances, so long as such evidence bears solely on the issue of witness 
credibility and not on the ultimate issue of what someone other than the patient would have 
done.”). 
 191. See Fain, 479 So. 2d at 1160 (Jones, J., dissenting) (quoting Alexander Morgan 
Capron, Informed Consent in Catastrophic Disease Research and Treatment, 123 U. PA. L. 
REV. 340, 420 (1974)).  
 192. Shultz, supra note 18, at 288-89 (“Objective evidence . . . could elucidate why this 
individual might or probably would have chosen a given path. . . .  Thus, the court would 
find useful testimony about choices that other people actually make when confronted with 
similar risks and odds.”).  
 193. See, Dickens & Cook, supra note 139, at 311 (“[P]atients exercise choice in the 
wider context of their perceptions, values, and intentions.”). 
 194. Id. at 310 (“[P]hysicians understand better than most patients the physical and other 
preconditions to patients’ disorders, and the most suitable medical measures for prevention, 
cure, or relief.”). 
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“they are demonstrable through evidence of conduct or words observable 
by others.”195 
For example, some individuals would prefer surgical treatment for back 
problems, while others would choose long-term rest.  The choice may 
depend on the patient’s aversion to surgery, job, or lifestyle.196  Some with 
cancer may choose a longer quantity of life, while others would choose a 
shorter life with more quality.197  Those who place an emphasis on living as 
long as possible are more likely to accept toxic treatments than those who 
would trade quantity for quality of life.198  Furthermore, “[i]ndividual 
factors such as family dynamics, religious beliefs, and financial burden may 
play a strong role in preferences.”199  In one study, 30% of adults stated that 
they would rather die “than live permanently in a nursing home.”200  This 
preference “may affect patients’ wishes regarding aggressive intervention 
during hospitalization.”201  In all of these examples, the patient’s values and 
preferences would significantly affect the decision the plaintiff would make 
if properly informed of the risks and alternatives.202  In an informed consent 
case, testimony concerning the patient’s expressed philosophical and 
religious beliefs, past behavior, and prior medical decisions could be used 
to test the credibility of the patient’s testimony concerning the decision she 
would have made had the omitted information been disclosed. 
                                                                                                                 
 195. Shultz, supra note 18, at 288. 
 196. Id. at 272 (“A preference for surgical treatment of a back problem or, alternatively, 
for long-term rest and traction, may depend on the patient’s job or lifestyle.”). 
 197. D. J. Perez et al., A Comparison of Time Trade-Off and Quality of Life Measures in 
Patients with Advanced Cancer, 6 QUAL. LIFE RES. 133, 138 (1997) (“Those who place 
emphasis on quality of life or who perceive their quality of life to be unacceptable are likely 
to trade-off quantity of life in favour of quality in decisions about treatment.”). 
 198. Id. (“Patients who place emphasis on quantity of life may be more ready to accept 
toxic treatments to prolong life.”). 
 199. See Lynne W. Stevenson et al., Changing Preferences for Survival After 
Hospitalization with Advanced Heart Failure, 52 J. AM. C. CARDIOLOGY 1702, 1707 (2008).  
Although this quote relates to patients with advanced heart failure, the quoted factors that 
play a role in choosing to trade quality of time for quantity would be the same. 
 200. Thomas J. Mattimore et al., Surrogate and Physician Understanding of Patients’ 
Preferences for Living Permanently in a Nursing Home, 45 J. AM. GERIATRICS SOC. 818, 823 
(1997) (“Fully 30% [of the patients in the study] stated that they would prefer to die rather 
than live permanently in a nursing home.”).   
 201. Id. at 822.  
 202. See James L. Bernat & Lynn M. Peterson, Patient-Centered Informed Consent in 
Surgical Practice, 141 ARCHIVES SURGERY 86, 87 (2006) (“Patients contribute their unique 
set of values, preferences, and health care goals through which they interpret the treatment 
recommendation.”). 
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Other examples provide even clearer illustrations of how evidence of the 
patient’s prior behavior and statements might affect the credibility of the 
patient’s testimony concerning the medical choice that would have been 
made.  Individuals concerned about chemical additives in food and 
pregnant women who prefer to avoid prescription drugs until childbirth 
would be more likely to choose a treatment that involves rest or natural 
remedies, rather than one that requires medication.203  A patient who had 
undergone several elective surgeries would find it difficult to argue that he 
would be averse to surgery.204  For example, in Smith v. Reisig, the 
defendant introduced evidence in an informed consent case that the plaintiff 
patient had consented to prior surgeries after being informed of the far 
greater risks of those procedures.205  Testimony concerning a patient’s 
values, prior statements, and behavior could be so compelling that it could 
be used to prove causation, even if the plaintiff died during the medical 
procedure. 
Using evidence of the patient’s prior statements, philosophical and 
religious beliefs, morals, and patterns of behavior to determine the medical 
decision a patient would have made is not a new idea.206  Courts regularly 
                                                                                                                 
 203. See Tietz, supra note 86, at 393-94 (“[T]he heightened concern about nutrition and 
health, which often causes a person to stop smoking and to avoid chemical additives in 
foods, may also lead that person to an aversion to all drugs and to a preference for the 
nondrug, or least-potent drug, alternative . . . [and] a pregnant woman might want to weigh 
for herself the benefits from her use of a particular drug against the risks the drug presents to 
the fetus.”). 
 204. Kraushar & Steinberg, supra note 152, at 353 (“If the plaintiff is a surgery seeker 
and has undergone countless elective procedures such as a face-lift or blepharoplasty, he 
may be far more likely to undergo surgery, regardless of the risks, than the prudent man.”). 
 205. Smith v. Reisig, 686 P.2d 285, 288 (Okla. 1984) (“[O]ther evidence indicated that 
she had been informed of far greater risks in the past than for this surgery, and still 
consented.”). 
 206. See, e.g, In re A.C., 573 A.2d 1235, 1250 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (“The court in a 
substituted judgment case . . . should pay special attention to the known values and goals of 
the incapacitated patient, and should strive, if possible, to extrapolate from those values and 
goals what the patient’s [medical] decision would be.”); In re Truselo, 846 A.2d 256, 271 
(Del. Fam. Ct. 2000) (quoting In re Tavel, 661 A.2d 1061, 1068 (Del. 1995) (“The surrogate 
considers the patient’s prior statements about and reactions to medical issues, and all the 
facts of the patient’s personality that the surrogate is familiar with—with, of course, 
particular reference to his or her relevant philosophical, theological, and ethical values—in 
order to extrapolate what course of medical treatment the patient would choose.”); Lynn E. 
Lebit, Compelled Medical Procedures Involving Minors and Incompetents and 
Misapplication of the Substituted Judgments Doctrine, 7 J.L. & HEALTH 107, 109-10 (1993) 
(“The once competent person has developed a system of morals and beliefs, and patterns of 
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use substituted judgment to determine the medical decision an incompetent 
person would have made when competent by taking these factors into 
account.207  
Thus, counsel and the court can warn the jury that the patient’s testimony 
may be self-serving.  The jury can evaluate the credibility of plaintiff’s 
testimony by weighing evidence concerning the medical treatment a 
reasonable person would have chosen under the circumstances and 
plaintiff’s explanation for deviating from this norm.  That evidence, 
combined with proof of prior statements, behavior, and values, will go a 
long way toward dealing with the negatives associated with a subjective 
causation standard.208   
VII. The Disclosure Standards in Every State Are Objective to Protect 
Physicians 
The techniques mentioned above should significantly reduce the 
problems associated with subjective causation, but cannot completely 
eliminate them.  This should not be a substantial concern because 
physicians can avoid liability entirely by giving appropriate disclosure to 
their patients.  New technologies can help physicians easily accomplish this 
goal.   
In order to succeed on an informed consent claim, the patient must prove 
(1) there was a duty to disclose, (2) breach of that duty, (3) causation, and 
(4) damages.209  Therefore, as the Supreme Court of Oklahoma wrote in 
                                                                                                                 
behavior which the court can examine when evaluating what she would do in a particular 
situation.”). 
 207. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Dir. Mo. Dep’t of Health, 497 U.S. 261, 271 (1990) (“[Under] a 
‘substituted judgment’ standard . . . courts were to determine what an incompetent 
individual’s decision would have been under the circumstances.”); In re Truselo, 846 A.2d at 
271 (“[The purpose of substituted judgment] is to ensure that the surrogate decision-maker 
determines, as best it can, what choice the individual, if competent, would have made with 
respect to medical procedures.”); Jennifer K. Robbennolt et al., Advancing the Rights of 
Children and Adolescents to be Altruistic: Bone Marrow Donation by Minors, 9 J.L. & 
HEALTH 213, 221 (1995) (quoting In re Conroy, 486 A.2d 1209, 1229 (N.J. 1985)) (“When 
executing a decision based on the substituted judgment standard, a court purports to 
‘determine and effectuate, insofar as possible, the decision that the patient would have made 
if competent.’”). 
 208. It should be noted that the subjective causation standard may still be “a very 
significant barrier” to recovery, although much less of a barrier than objective causation.  
See McNichols, supra note 51, at 731.  
 209. See Kroft, supra note 47, at 464-65; Weisbard, supra note 96, at 758 (footnote 
omitted) (“The plaintiff must allege and prove that the physician violated a legally 
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Scott v. Bradford, “a careful practitioner can always protect himself by 
insuring that he has adequately informed each patient he treats.  If he does 
not breach this duty, a causation problem will not arise.”210 
Both of the disclosure standards used in the United States are objective, 
so they are not hard for physicians to meet.211  Approximately half the 
states use a physician-based or professional approach.212  Under this 
approach, physicians must disclose only the medical information that a 
reasonable physician in the same or a similar community213 would disclose 
under similar circumstances.214   
Some have criticized the professional standard for deferring too much to 
the medical community and for requiring the plaintiff to produce an expert 
                                                                                                                 
established duty to disclose a particular risk, that the undisclosed risk materialized in a 
physical injury, and that the failure to disclose ‘caused’ the patient to consent to a procedure 
which otherwise would have been rejected.”). 
 210. Scott v. Bradford, 606 P.2d 554, 559 (Okla. 1979). 
 211. Sones, supra note 58, at 260 (“As far as this Author is aware, there are no courts 
adopting a subjective disclosure standard.”).  Generally, to meet informed consent 
requirements, physicians must disclose the nature and purpose of the treatment, risks, and 
alternatives.  See, e. g., Atwell, supra note 69, at 596 (footnote omitted) (“[E]ach patient 
must be apprised of the nature of the treatment along with any corresponding risks.  In 
addition, the patient should be given information regarding alternatives to treatment.”).  
 212. Krause, supra note 33, at 314 (“According to a recent survey, roughly half of the 
states have adopted each standard [the ‘professional’ standard and the ‘patient need’ 
standard], although the professional standard has been adopted by the majority of states that 
have enacted informed consent statutes.”); Robert Post, Informed Consent to Abortion: A 
First Amendment Analysis of Compelled Physician Speech, 2007 U. ILL. L. REV. 939, 969 
(“Jurisdictions are roughly split in defining the scope of a physician’s obligation . . . . Some 
adopt the ‘professional standard,’ . . . . Others adopt the ‘prudent patient’ standard . . . .”); 
Richards, supra note 12, at 71 (“About twenty-five states adhere to the ‘professional-
oriented’ standard of disclosure . . . . An equal number of states measure disclosure in terms 
of the ‘prudent patient’ standard . . . .”). 
 213. FURROW ET AL., supra note 125, at 310 (“As medicine has become more national in 
education and practice, the locality rule gave way to a national test for knowledge and 
skill.”); Richards, supra note 12, at 84 (footnote omitted) (“Some jurisdictions apply the 
‘locality rule,’ which limits expert testimony to those professionals practicing in the same 
profession within the same locality. However, in recent years, a growing number of 
jurisdictions have opted for a ‘national standard,’ which applies to physicians practicing the 
same specialty in the same or similar community.”). 
 214. Kroft, supra note 47, at 461 (“The traditional standard requires disclosure of 
information that a reasonable health care provider would disclose in similar 
circumstances.”); Sones, supra note 58, at 259 (“[T]he physician must disclose only the 
information that a reasonable medical practitioner in the same or similar circumstances 
would disclose.”).  
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to testify as to the community disclosure standard.215  Under the 
professional standard, the patient has no right to know about any medical 
risks or alternatives unless physicians collectively decide to disclose 
them.216  This would give “virtually unlimited discretion to the medical 
community to define the proper scope of disclosure.”217  The professional 
standard also places a burden on the plaintiff to find an expert because the 
scope of disclosure is viewed as a medical decision.218  Finding “an expert 
witness, such as a physician, who [is] willing to testify against a colleague 
about what would have been appropriate disclosure in a similar situation” 
may prove to be an insurmountable burden for a patient.219 
To deal with these concerns, about half of the states follow the modern 
trend and have adopted the patient-oriented or patient-centered standard.220  
Under this standard, the physician must disclose the risks and alternatives 
that a reasonable person in the patient’s circumstances would find material 
                                                                                                                 
 215. Other commentators support the professional standard.  See, e.g., McNichols, supra 
note 51, at 718-19 n.42 (noting that the reasons supporting the professional standard include: 
“(1) the complexities of medical science entail that the issue of disclosure, even if not 
viewed as a medical question, is still better left to the judgment of medical professionals; 
[and] (2) the professional standard gives professionals a fair way of learning what they must 
disclose; without its protection they have no real way of knowing what the law 
proscribes . . . .”); Smith, II, supra note 57, at 120 (arguing that the professional standard is 
preferable because the patient-centered standard “could drive the physician to describe even 
quack treatments for fear that a future jury could find that a reasonable patient might have 
wished to be informed of such treatments”). 
 216. Tietz, supra note 86, at 372 (“[Under the professional standard,] [t]he patient has no 
right to know about therapeutic risks unless the medical community collectively has 
determined to disclose those risks.”). 
 217. Richards, supra note 12, at 97; see also McNichols, supra note 51, at 719 (quoting 
Scott v. Bradford, 606 P.2d 554, 557 (Okla. 1979)) (“[The professional standard] would 
perpetuate medical paternalism by giving the profession sweeping authority to decide 
unilaterally what is in the patient’s best interests.”). 
 218. Atwell, supra note 69, at 596 (“Typically, expert testimony is required to establish 
the contours of [the professional standard].”); Kroft, supra note 47, at 461 (“[The 
professional standard] requires expert testimony because the determination of what 
information needs to be disclosed is viewed as a medical question.”); Smith, II, supra note 
57, at 119 (“[A] jury panel will seek to decide [the professional standard] by comparing the 
testimony of competing medical experts.”). 
 219. Lambris, supra note 58, at 243-44; see also Richards, supra note 12, at 98 (“[T]he 
physician-based standard imposes an insurmountable burden on plaintiffs faced with finding 
physicians willing to breach the ‘community of silence’ inherent among medical 
professionals.”).  
 220. See supra note 212. 
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in making a medical decision.221  Information is considered material if it is 
likely to affect the reasonable patient’s medical choice concerning 
treatment.222  Thus, the professional standard focuses on what the 
reasonable physician would disclose, while the patient standard focuses on 
what the reasonable patient would want to know.223  With the change in 
standard, the viewpoint switched from the physician to the patient.224 
For this reason, the patient-oriented standard is more aligned with 
protecting patient autonomy, the main purpose of informed consent laws.225  
States adopting this standard recognize that physician disclosure obligations 
                                                                                                                 
 221. Dolgin, supra note 54, at 152 (“[Under the patient-oriented standard,] the 
physician’s failure to disclose [is] judged with reference to the information that a reasonably 
prudent person would find ‘material’ in deciding whether to consent to proposed 
treatment(s).”); Richards, supra note 12, at 86 (“[In Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772 
(D.C. Cir. 1972)], the court determined that the objective standard should be measured by 
what a reasonable person in the patient’s position would deem material under the 
circumstances involved.”). 
 222. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 787 (quoting Jon. R. Waltz & Thomas W. Scheuneman, 
Informed Consent to Therapy, 64 NW. U. L. REV. 628, 640 (1970)) (“[A] risk is thus material 
when a reasonable person, in what the physician knows or should know to be the patient’s 
position, would be likely to attach significance to the risk or cluster of risks in deciding 
whether or not to forego the proposed therapy.”); Gregory D. Jones, Primum Non Nocere: 
The Expanding ‘Honest Services’ Mail Fraud Statute and the Physician-Patient Fiduciary 
Relationship, 51 VAND. L. REV. 139, 159 (1998) (“[M]aterial information [is] any 
information that a reasonable patient would deem relevant or want disclosed.”). 
 223. McNichols, supra note 51, at 719 (“[A] patient-oriented standard [is] measured by 
what patients would want to know, rather than by what physicians think should be 
disclosed.”); Richards, supra note 12, at 82 (footnote omitted) (“The professional standard 
focuses on what a reasonable physician would disclose in the same or similar circumstances.  
In contrast, the patient standard focuses on what information a reasonable patient would 
consider important in order to make an informed medical decision.”). 
 224. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 787 (“[T]he issue on nondisclosure must be approached 
from the viewpoint of the reasonableness of the physician’s divulgence in terms of what he 
knows or should know to be the patient’s informational needs.”); Atwell, supra note 69, at 
596-97 (“[T]he court in Canterbury reasoned that whether or not adequate information has 
been given to the patient must be determined from the viewpoint of the reasonable patient—
not the viewpoint of the medical professional.”). 
 225. Atwell, supra note 69, at 597 n.34 (“From a bioethical perspective, the reasonable 
patient standard is much more compatible with the notion of patient autonomy than the 
professional standard.”); Kapp, supra note 120, at 97 (“The philosophical rationale . . . for 
the progression in informed consent doctrine from a reasonable physician to a patient-
oriented standard of information disclosure is the belief that the latter approach better 
promotes the ethical ideal of patient autonomy, while the former approach reinforces the 
negative practice of physician paternalism . . . .”); Krause, supra note 33, at 316 (“On a 
theoretical level, the patient need standard is far more protective of patient autonomy than a 
standard that defers to professional medical judgment . . . .”). 
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should be determined by the patient’s needs, rather than the medical 
judgment of physicians.226  This standard also avoids the necessity of using 
expert testimony to prove that the disclosure standard has not been met.  
Although some expert testimony might be indispensable to explain the 
medical procedures involved and the risks and alternatives,227 no expert 
testimony is necessary with respect to the patient disclosure standard 
itself.228  Deciding what a reasonable person would want to know does not 
require technical expertise.229   
Some have criticized the patient-oriented standard for not going far 
enough to protect patient autonomy.230  Both this standard and the 
professional standard are objective and neither considers the needs and 
preferences of the individual patient.231  While recognizing these concerns, 
the courts and legislatures selected an objective standard to ensure that 
diligent physicians could meet the disclosure requirements.232  An objective 
                                                                                                                 
 226. See, e.g., Sard v. Hardy, 379 A.2d 1014, 1021 (Md. 1977) (“[P]rotection of the 
patient’s fundamental right of physical self-determination—the very cornerstone of the 
informed consent doctrine—mandates that the scope of a physician’s duty to disclose 
therapeutic risks and alternatives be governed by the patient’s informational needs.”). 
 227. BARRY R. FURROW ET AL., HEALTH LAW 356 (West, 4th ed. 2001) (“[With respect to 
the patient-oriented standard,] [e]xpert testimony is still needed . . . to clarify the treatments 
and their probabilities of risks.”). 
 228. Kroft, supra note 47, at 461 (“[The patient-oriented approach] does not require 
expert testimony . . . .”). 
 229. FURROW ET AL., supra note 125, at 356 (“[T]he question of whether a physician 
disclosed risks which a reasonable person would find material is for the trier of fact, and 
technical expertise is not required.”). 
 230. Krause, supra note 33, at 316 (“[E]ven the patient need standard has been criticized 
for relying on the hypothetical ‘reasonable person’ rather than focusing on what would have 
assisted the particular patient in the exercise of his or her autonomy.”); Tietz, supra note 86, 
at 379-80 (footnote omitted) (“[C]ourts do not impose a duty of full communication on 
physicians, which is to the detriment of the particular patient, who has needs, priorities, and 
preferences different from those of the ‘reasonable’ patient.”). 
 231. Although both disclosure standards are objective, they have a subjective component.  
The disclosure must be reasonable “under the circumstances.”  “Under the circumstances” is 
generally interpreted to mean medical circumstances, but would probably also require 
physicians to address the patient’s expressed personal concerns.  See Gatter, supra note 70, 
at 568, 576-77 (giving examples of cases where the courts held the physician liable based on 
the physician’s actual knowledge of the patient’s unique situation at the time of disclosure). 
 232. Tietz, supra note 86, at 380 (noting that the court in Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 
772 (D.C. Cir. 1972), chose an objective standard because “physicians cannot know 
individual patients well enough to determine what information is material to their personal 
choices”).  It should also be noted that under both standards, “physicians are obligated to 
disclose only those risks ‘of which the physician should have been aware’, which is to say 
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standard does not unfairly require the physician to guess the peculiar 
idiosyncrasies and preferences of an individual patient.233  While the 
physician cannot know the exact concerns of each patient, she can protect 
herself by meeting the disclosure needs of the average, reasonable 
person.234  Thus, objective disclosure balances the informational needs of 
the patient and the liability concerns of the physician in an attempt to 
protect both235 and, unlike objective causation, provides this protection 
without eviscerating the informed consent cause of action. 
VIII. Disclosure of Medical Information to Patients Is Often Not 
Meaningful or Intelligible 
Despite the well-intentioned disclosure standards, disclosure of medical 
information to patients is far from optimal.  Studies have shown that the 
information given to patients is often not meaningful or intelligible.236 
Patients frequently receive written forms containing a formalistic 
recitation of endless potential risks and complicated medical information.237  
                                                                                                                 
only those risks that are ‘recognized within the medical community.’”  See Post, supra note 
212, at 969-70. 
 233. See Katz, supra note 153, at 77 (“[In Canterbury], Justice Robinson appreciated that 
a subjective test was more in keeping with the right of self-determination, but he rejected it 
for fear that such a test would unfairly burden physicians by requiring them to guess the 
needs of particular patients.”); Sones, supra note 58, at 260 (“[O]ne questions whether 
imposing liability based on a subjective, patient-based standard of disclosure might render 
physicians, who typically are unaware of the intricacies of each patient’s personal 
preferences, unable to avoid liability for nondisclosure.”). 
 234. Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 787 (“He cannot know with complete exactitude what the 
patient would consider important to his decision, but on the basis of his medical training and 
experience he can sense how the average, reasonable patient expectably would react.”); 
Marsingill v. O’Malley, 128 P.3d 151, 159 (Alaska 2006) (“A doctor’s failure to provide 
sufficient information will not render him liable unless the doctor knew or reasonably should 
have known that the patient might have considered the information to be important.”); 
Richards, supra note 12, at 95 (“[E]rring on the side of more disclosure means that a 
physician is susceptible only to the most obscure of medical catastrophes.”). 
 235. Krause, supra note 33, at 316 (quoting Canterbury, 464 F.2d at 787) (“[T]he 
disclosure [standard] ‘remains objective with due regard for the patient’s informational 
needs and with suitable leeway for the physician’s situation.’”).  
 236. Sones, supra note 58, at 266 (“[S]tudies and commentary indicate[ ] that actual 
informed consent practices fail to [communicate reliable risk information in an intelligible 
and meaningful fashion].”). 
 237. Victor Ali, Note, Consent Forms as Part of the Informed Consent Process: Moving 
Away from ‘Medical Miranda’, 54 HASTINGS L.J. 1575, 1578 (2003) (“[C]onsent forms are 
often used to inundate the patient with legally required information, without regard to the 
usefulness of this approach in increasing the patient’s level of understanding.”). 
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol64/iss4/8
2012] REVITALIZING INFORMED CONSENT 741 
 
 
The purpose of the forms is usually to protect the physician against liability, 
rather than to ensure that the patient comprehends the medical procedure, 
its risks and alternatives.238  Patients understand this purpose when reading 
the forms and are skeptical of the disclosures they contain.239 
Inundating patients with medical facts can result in information overload, 
especially because there is usually no attempt to highlight the disclosures 
that are most important.240  In addition, because the forms are designed to 
protect physicians, rather than to ensure comprehension,241 the language is 
frequently too advanced for the average patient.242  The forms also do not 
take cultural or linguistic barriers into account.243   
To deal with these concerns, commentators have suggested highlighting 
the most useful information and adopting non-legal language and bullet 
points.244  Nonspecific terms, such as “high,” “insignificant,” “probably,” or 
“may,” could be clarified by comparing risks.245  For example, the patient 
                                                                                                                 
 238. Id. at 1577 (“Under [the harm-avoidance model], physicians disclose the risks of 
and alternatives to a particular treatment to avoid lawsuits, rather than to allow the patient to 
make an independent and informed decision.”). 
 239. See id. at 1584 (“[B]ecause patients view consent forms as legal protection for 
physicians, they are skeptical of the forms’ utility as a tool to enhance their own 
understanding of the medical procedure.”). 
 240. Krause, supra note 33, at 358 (noting that “making an endless variety of information 
available in the absence of research identifying which data is truly useful” results in 
“‘information overload’ [and] still leaves consumers without necessary information”).  
 241. Ali, supra note 237, at 1584 (“[W]hile much effort has been dedicated to increasing 
the content of consent forms, little attention has been paid to how easy they are to read and 
understand.”). 
 242. Kapp, supra note 120, at 100 (quoting JUDITH HIBBARD ET AL., AARP PUB. POLICY 
INST., HEALTH LITERACY RESEARCH REPORT: IDENTIFYING MEDICARE BENEFICIARIES WITH 
POOR HEALTH LITERACY SKILLS: IS A SHORT SCREENING INDEX FEASIBLE 1 (2005)), available 
at http://assets.aarp.org/rgcenter/health/2005_01_literacy.pdf (“[Literacy levels may] 
‘prevent people from being involved and active participants in their care.’”); Melissa M. 
Bottrell et al., Hospital Informed Consent for Procedure Forms: Facilitating Quality 
Patient-Physician Interaction, 135 ARCHIVES SURGERY 26, 27 (2000) (“Most forms are 
written with language too sophisticated for the majority of people.”). 
 243. Bottrell et al., supra note 242, at 27 (“[P]atients often do not receive adequate 
information due to technical jargon or cultural or linguistic barriers.”).  
 244. Id. (“Suggested changes [to informed consent forms] include writing in nonlegalistic 
language, making less abstract statements, and including graphic features such as bullet 
points and boldface-type statements.”). 
 245. Sones, supra note 58, at 266 (“General terms such as ‘high’ or ‘insignificant; and 
ambiguous terms such as ‘may’ or ‘probably will’ give the patient little basis for assessing 
risk in a refined way.”); see also Schuck, supra note 86, at 906 (urging physicians to 
“describe risks in comparative terms”). 
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could be told that the risk of harm from the surgery is equivalent to the risk 
of a collision while driving home from work.246  Even though these 
suggestions would be easy to implement, the problems remain. 
Physician conversations with patients do not fare much better.  Meetings 
with physicians average about seven minutes.247  During this short time 
period, physicians often disclose too much information and employ too 
much medical jargon.248  Patients do not have sufficient time to absorb the 
information and express their concerns.249 
In addition, physicians frequently tailor discussions to convince the 
patient to choose the treatment the physician has already selected, rather 
than to elicit the patient’s preferences.250  This practice is likely to affect 
patient autonomy, especially when the patient is in poor health.251  
                                                                                                                 
 246. Schuck, supra note 85, at 949 (recommending that the physician use a “comparative 
contextualized framework” when describing risks.  For example, the physician “might 
compare the medical risk to the risk of certain types of common accidents or other adverse 
outcomes (e.g., collisions from driving at night, lung cancer from smoking, complications 
from drinking alcohol while pregnant) . . . .”). 
 247. Peter Brensilver, E-Formed Consent: Evaluating the Interplay Between Interactive 
Technology and Informed Consent, 70 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 613, 625 (2002) (“The average 
doctor visit is currently about seven minutes . . . .”). 
 248. Ken Berger, Informed Consent: Information or Knowledge? 22 MED. & L. 743, 747 
(2003) (“Impediments to knowledge include: too much information, contradictory 
information, too much medical jargon, too much information at one time, and insufficient 
time to absorb the information.”); see also David Sobel & Pamela L. Popp, Informed 
Consent and Expectation Management: A Case Study, J. HEALTHCARE RISK MGMT., vol. 26, 
no. 4, AT 21, 22 (2006) (“Traditional informed consent, where the physician relays the risks 
and benefits of the procedure or treatment to the patient often leaves the patient feeling 
overwhelmed and confused by the quantity of the information provided.  In fact, on average, 
approximately 80 percent of the information conveyed to a patient in a clinic setting is 
summarily forgotten.”). 
 249. Canterbury v. Spence, 464 F.2d 772, 783, n.36, 790 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (“Perhaps 
relatively few patients could in any event identify the relevant questions in the absence of 
prior explanation by the physician.”). 
 250. Morris, supra note 11, at 315 (“[I]nformation is often given to patients not to enable 
them to choose, but to encourage them to cooperate with doctors and to comply with 
decisions that have already been made, not by patients as law envisions, but by doctors.”); 
Rachael Andersen-Watts, The Failure of Breast Cancer Informed Consent Statutes, 14 
MICH. J. GENDER & L. 201, 210 (2008) (“Decisions may have more to do with presentation 
than information, considering the inherent dependence of patients on doctors.”); Madison, 
supra note 27, at 12 (“Physicians may influence patients’ decisions through the nature of 
their disclosures.”). 
 251. Physicians can frame the information they disclose to affect patients’ decisions.  See 
Roybal, 778 P.2d at 117 (citing a study demonstrating that framing risks in terms of survival 
or mortality significantly affected the research subject’s decisions and noting that “[o]n the 
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Empirical studies suggest that patients suffering from illness are less 
assertive and feel compelled to accept the physician’s recommendations.252  
As this discussion illustrates, the courts and physicians focus on patient 
consent, rather than patient understanding.253  But to achieve the purpose of 
informed consent—rather than merely meeting its technical requirements—
the focus must be on determining the patient’s treatment preferences and 
delivering information designed to achieve patient understanding.254 
Researchers recommend that physicians accomplish these goals by 
implementing shared decision-making,255 which emphasizes on-going 
collaboration between the physician and patient.256  Ideally, the physician 
would analyze the technical medical facts and deliver that information to 
the patient in a clear and comprehensible manner.257  The patient would 
                                                                                                                 
average, subjects preferred radiation therapy to surgery 42% of the time when the 
information was presented in terms of the probability of dying, but only 25% of the time 
when information was presented in terms of the probability of living”). 
 252. Guy A. M. Widdershoven & Frank W.S.M. Verheggen, Improving Informed 
Consent by Implementing Shared Decisionmaking in Health Care, IRB, July-Aug. 1999, at 
1, 1 (“Empirical studies suggest that as a result of illness, patients tend to feel they must do 
whatever the doctor suggests, and tend to become less aggressive in seeking alternatives and 
passive out of a sense of powerlessness in the face of massive technical information.”). 
 253. Ali, supra note 237, at 1589 (“Both legislatures and courts focus primarily on 
whether or not there was formalistic consent to a particular medical procedure, rather than 
on whether the patient fully understood the information and played an active role in making 
the decision.”); Bottrell et al., supra note 242, at 27 (“Physicians rarely assess patients’ 
understanding of [the] information or treatment decision.”). 
 254. Schuck, supra note 86, at 903 (noting that interactions between doctors and patients 
should “be dialogic rather than authoritative, tailored to the individual patient’s emotional 
needs and cognitive capacities rather than formulaic, aimed at maximizing patient autonomy 
and comprehension rather than mere information flow, and sensitive to the distortions that 
can be created by power differentials between physician and patient.”). 
 255. Widdershoven & Verheggen, supra note 252, at 4 (“Shared decisionmaking is 
increasingly advocated as an ideal model of treatment decisionmaking, striving for an 
adequate balance between physicians and patients in a collaborative process.”). 
 256. Jeremy Sugarman, Informed Consent, Shared Decision-Making and Complementary 
Alternative Medicine, 31 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 247, 247 (2003) (“[T]here now seems to be a 
consensus that informed consent should be considered a process rather than a punctuated 
event consisting of the completion of an informed consent form.”); Widdershoven & 
Verheggen, supra note 252, at 4 (“[I]nformed consent [should be] an ongoing process of 
communication about what should be done.”). 
 257. Walter, supra note 57, at 547-48 (“The informed consent doctrine envisages a joint 
decision-making process in which the physician digests the technical information for the 
patient and transmits this information in a manner comprehensible by a lay person.”). 
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discuss her personal preferences, goals, fears, and values.  Then, together, 
the physician and patient would agree on an acceptable treatment plan.258   
The interaction between the physician and patient should generally 
consist of more than a single, one-time meeting.259  Patients are often 
anxious during their initial appointment with a physician260 and need time 
to digest the medical information provided.261  A follow-up meeting would 
give the patient an opportunity to deal with her questions and concerns.  
Equally important, the patient should consult with the physician over the 
course of her illness.  As her condition progresses, the patient makes 
multiple medical decisions.262  She must ensure that her understanding stays 
current and that the physician assimilates her preferences and needs into the 
treatment plan.263  For these reasons, the treatment of the patient should be a 
joint process during which the physician and patient coordinate to 
maximize patient comprehension and autonomy.264 
The PPACA incorporates these goals by including a “program to 
facilitate shared decision making.”265  The express purpose of this program 
is “to facilitate collaborative processes between patients and [health care 
                                                                                                                 
 258. Bernat & Peterson, supra note 202, at 87 (“In shared decision-making, the physician 
and patient compose a decision-making partnership.  The physician contributes 
information . . . .  Patients contribute their unique set of values, preferences, and health care 
goals . . . .”). 
 259. Arabian, supra note 117, at 273, n.47 (“[I]t is rare for the decisionmaking of a 
patient to conform to the single event paradigm . . . .”); Melissa M. Goldstein, The Effects of 
Health Information Technology on the Physician-Patient Relationship: Health Information 
Technology and the Idea of Informed Consent, 38 J.L. MED. & ETHICS 27, 28 (2010) (“The 
legal doctrine of informed consent . . . is generally conceived as a one-time event, while the 
model based in autonomy and authorization emphasizes process and the clinician-patient 
interaction, which in the treatment context sometimes includes repeated exchanges and de-
emphasizes a written document.”). 
 260. Ali, supra note 237, at 1578 (“[If the decision is] at a single discrete point in time, 
the patient is likely to be experiencing high levels of anxiety at the moment of the decision—
another barrier to the effective integration of relevant information.”). 
 261. Id. (“The one-shot nature of the medical decision under this model makes it difficult 
for patients to assimilate the voluminous and complicated information with which they are 
being presented.”). 
 262. Id. at 1577-78 (“In reality . . . [t]reatment . . . involves a series of interactions and 
decisions as more information becomes available and the patient’s understanding of the 
procedure evolves.”). 
 263. Bernat & Peterson, supra note 202, at 86 (“Surgical consent is not an event or a 
signature on a form but is an ongoing process of communication that continues throughout 
the preoperative, perioperative, and postoperative care.”). 
 264. Schuck, supra note 86, at 903. 
 265. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 299b-36(a) (West 2011).   
https://digitalcommons.law.ou.edu/olr/vol64/iss4/8
2012] REVITALIZING INFORMED CONSENT 745 
 
 
providers],” provide patients with “information about trade-offs among 
treatment options, and facilitate[ ] the incorporation of patient preferences 
and values into the medical plan.”266 
While implementing these changes is desirable, this article does not 
suggest that current disclosure standards be modified to actively require 
shared decision-making or meaningful disclosure.  Although the medical 
community should strive to meet these goals, constructing complex statutes 
requiring detailed disclosure and physician/patient collaboration does not 
appear to be the answer.267  It would be virtually impossible to create a 
statute that successfully mandates the details of ongoing physician/patient 
interactions, especially when the goal of those interactions is to achieve an 
effective physician/patient partnership for decision-making.   
Instead, this article advocates a change from objective to subjective 
causation to give teeth to current informed consent laws. The current laws 
have done little to encourage physicians to enhance the decision-making 
process.  Moving to subjective causation will make informed consent a 
viable cause of action and hopefully serve as a catalyst for meaningful 
disclosure.  Also, because subjective causation highlights what the patient 
would have chosen knowing the risks and alternatives, that standard will 
help focus attention on individual preferences and concerns.  Making 
informed consent a viable claim is a push in the right direction and that 
push has a greater likelihood of resulting in serious change than ever before 
because of exciting new technologies.   
IX. Current Technology Can Make Informed Consent Inexpensive and Easy 
Electronic communication has been described as the “‘next 
transformation’ in healthcare.”268  This transformation includes the use of 
                                                                                                                 
 266. Id. 
 267. Mariner, supra note 10, at 405 (“One thing seems clear.  We should not inject more 
law into the physician-patient relationship than absolutely necessary.”).  
 268. Frances H. Miller, Health Care Information Technology and Informed Consent: 
Computers and the Doctor-Patient Relationship, 31 IND. L. REV. 1019, 1022-23 (1998) 
(“On-line services have been described as the ‘next transformation’ in health care . . . .”); 
Gary L. Kreps & Linda Neuhauser, New Directions in eHealth Communication: 
Opportunities and Challenges, 78 PATIENT EDUC. & COUNSELING 329, 329 (2010) (“There is 
a communication revolution brewing in the modern health care system fueled by the growth 
of powerful new health information technologies . . . .”); Brensilver, supra note 247, at 624 
(“The emergence of electronic communication creates a unique opportunity to rectify the 
broken structure of informed consent . . . .”). 
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computers to supplement traditional informed consent.269  Multimedia 
presentations and extensive databases270 can be used to increase patient 
comprehension and improve patient interactions with physicians.271  The 
PPACA actively supports the use of effective decision aids to provide 
patients with information about treatment options.  A decision aid is defined 
in the Act as “an educational tool that helps patients . . . [t]o understand and 
communicate their beliefs and preferences related to their treatment options, 
and to decide with their health care provider what treatments are best for 
them . . . .”272 
Computer programs have unparalleled potential to increase patient 
understanding of medical procedures, risks, and alternatives.  There are 
already several websites that provide all the information necessary to give 
patients detailed disclosures on many medical treatments,273 and some of 
these websites use current educational methods to effectively transmit this 
information to the patient.  Educational tools can include explanatory text, 
graphics, photographs, animations, diagrams,274 and questions with 
                                                                                                                 
 269. Widdershoven & Verheggen, supra note 252, at 2 (“One way to enhance informed 
consent is to design computer programs that enable patients to actively acquire information 
and balance options.”). 
 270. Laura Landro, Consent Forms that Patients can Understand, WALL ST. J., Feb. 6, 
2008 at D1 (“[Hospitals] are [ ] turning to high-tech solutions, such as Web-based databases 
to help calculate risks and benefits for patients before consents are signed . . . .”). 
 271. See, e.g., Brensilver, supra note 247, at 624. 
 272. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 299b-36(b)(1). 
 273. See John Pulley, The Age of Consent Tools, GOV’T HEALTH IT (Nov. 7, 2008), 
http://govhealthit.com/news/age-consent-tools (“[iMedConsent] has consent forms for more 
than 2,100 medical and surgical procedures, patient education documents and an image 
gallery that doctors use to explain complex procedures.”). 
 274. See e.g., Arnold J. Rosoff, Informed Consent in the Electronic Age, 25 AM. J.L. & 
MED. 367, 368 (1999) (noting that computer programs can contain thorough explanations, 
full details on the risks and consequences of the available options, an opportunity to test 
comprehension, sophisticated diagrams, computer animations, and other cutting-edge 
instructional devices.); Melissa Bekelja Wanzer et al., Enhancing the “Informed” in 
Informed Consent: A Pilot Test of a Multimedia Presentation, 25 HEALTH COMM. 365, 367 
(2010) (noting that multimedia computer presentations can “utilize a number of strategies 
such as simple language [and] graphics.”); Brensilver, supra note 247, at 624 (“Portnoy’s 
web site depicts approximately 40 operations through text, illustrations, photographs and 
animation . . . .”); Brensilver, supra note 247, at 624, n.98 (“Forbes magazine noted that 
YourSurgery.com contains ‘detailed descriptions on over 50 surgeries,’ and that “[a]ll the 
details come complete with anatomy descriptions, complications, and graphics of the 
incisions.”). 
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feedback.275  The disclosures include explanations of preoperative, 
operative, and postoperative care and the risks, benefits and alternatives to 
treatment.276   
The programs can also be personalized based on language preference277 
and planned treatment.  Some computer systems have large databases and 
can tailor the information supplied to the patient’s specific medical 
condition and procedure.278  They can also deliver personalized consent 
forms adapted to the patient’s individual medical diagnosis.279 
The use of multimedia on-line sources for supplying necessary 
disclosures has several advantages over traditional meetings with 
physicians.  A multimedia approach, with diagrams, animations, and other 
current instructional devices, can vastly improve patient understanding and 
recall.280  “In fact, many researchers have found that knowledge increased 
                                                                                                                 
 275. Wanzer et al., supra note 274, at 367 (noting that there were several studies of 
multimedia presentations containing questions with feedback); Brensilver, supra note 247, at 
624 (“Computer-based patient education programs can be used to . . . present[ ] 
understandable text and diagrams and test [ ] the patient’s knowledge as he or she 
proceeds.”); Landro, supra note 270, at 35 (“One study at UCSF found that by writing 
consent forms at a sixth-grade reading level, testing patients’ comprehension and explaining 
things until they understood, the number of patients who could answer comprehension 
questions correctly rose to 98% from between 15% and 28%.”). 
 276. Sobel & Popp, supra note 248, at 23 (“Using multiple learning modalities and 
medical animations, the [online interactive educational] tool guides patients through the 
experience from pre-op to post-op, including risks, benefits and alternatives.”). 
 277. Wanzer et al., supra note 274, at 367 (noting that multimedia computer 
presentations can use “oral information presented in different languages to overcome 
barriers associated with informed consent.”). 
 278. Kreps & Neuheauser, supra note 268, at 330 (“[H]ealth educators can use computer 
systems to select information from large databases and match it with an individual’s 
attributes or preferences (‘mass customization’ or ‘computer tailoring’).”); Landro, supra 
note 270, at D1 (“Web-based databases [can] help calculate risks and benefits for patients 
before consents are signed . . . .”). 
 279. See e.g., John A. Valenza, SmartConsent: A Computerized Informed Consent for 
Dental Patients, AMIA 2008 Symposium Proceedings 1161, 1161 (2008) (“[T]he advent of 
electronic health records allows an informed consent to be automatically personalized based 
on the patient’s demographic profile, literacy level, language preference, planned treatment, 
and prior medical history.”); Pulley, supra note 273 (“[iMedConsent’s computer system] has 
consent forms for more than 2,100 medical and surgical procedures . . . .”). 
 280. Rosoff, supra note 274, at 373 (“[Videotapes were a] major improvement in terms 
of the ability to present information in an easily understandable form . . . .”); Wanzer et al., 
supra note 274, at 367 (noting that graphics and animation were “shown to increase 
comprehension” and that several studies of multimedia presentations containing questions 
with feedback found “that patients viewing the presentations had higher knowledge scores 
than those that did not”). 
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in groups receiving computer-based information over a traditional oral 
presentation.”281  The medical information can also be presented more 
thoroughly and effectively than in face-to-face meetings with physicians 
because there are no time constraints.282   
Another benefit of a computer program is that the patient can set his own 
pace for getting through the material.  He can take as long as necessary to 
understand the information283 and can review the disclosures and 
demonstrations multiple times.284  The patient also has time to absorb the 
material presented285 and to discuss options and concerns with family and 
friends prior to meeting with the physician.286  
The physician/patient meeting should take place even when multimedia 
programs are used.  While computer systems improve patient 
understanding, they should not serve as a substitute for face-to-face 
interactions with the physician.  The patient needs the physician to answer 
her questions, clear up any confusion, and address her personal concerns.287  
                                                                                                                 
 281. Wanzer et al., supra note 274, at 367; T. H. Moseley et al., Effects of Presentation 
Method on the Understanding of Informed Consent, 90 BR. J. OPTHALMOL. 990, 991 (2006) 
(“[T]he use of visual aids improved the ability of our participants to remember facts and 
risks associated with cataract surgery beyond a verbal presentation alone.”); Kiss et al., 
supra note 153, at 95 (“[I]t has been well documented in several clinical studies that very 
little of the information given during the [traditional] informed consent procedure can be 
retained and recalled by the patients even [one] day after the surgery.”). 
 282. Rosoff, supra note 274, at 367 (“[T]he computer program can convey the complex 
facts that bear on this decision process more fully and effectively than [the physician] has 
the ability or time to do . . . .”). 
 283. Id. (“[Patients] can consider each aspect of the explanation fully, spending as long 
on each part as they feel is necessary.”); Wanzer et al., supra note 274, at 367 (noting that, 
with computer presentations, patients are “more in control of their learning pace”). 
 284. Sobel & Popp, supra note 248, at 23 (“[O]pportunities are given to . . . review a 
specific section before proceeding to the end of the [interactive educational] tool.”); Wanzer 
et al., supra note 274, at 367 (“Each patient would see the same information, ensuring that 
information is not skipped over”). 
 285. Brensilver, supra note 247, at 625 (“Patients can benefit from a web-based 
disclosure by gaining additional time, privacy (at their home), and confidentiality while 
perusing a wide scope of information.”). 
 286. Rosoff, supra note 274, at 367 (“[Patients] can discuss the information and the 
choices more freely than they may feel comfortable doing in the doctor’s presence.”); Sobel 
& Popp, supra note 248, at 21 (“A significant percentage of the patients even engaged their 
family and friends in reviewing the [on-line interactive educational] tool . . . .”). 
 287. Rosoff, supra note 274, at 383 (“[I]t is unlikely that any form of information 
exchange, however complete in other respects, will be deemed satisfactory unless the patient 
has the opportunity to meet face-to-face with the physician to ask questions, request 
clarifications and voice concerns or reservations.”). 
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The physician must ascertain the patient’s values and preferences so that 
the physician and patient can decide together on a treatment plan.288  The 
face-to-face meeting is also invaluable in developing a trusting 
relationship.289  
Computer systems can make the meeting between the physician and 
patient more meaningful and beneficial for both.  By the time the meeting 
takes place, the patient will have digested the medical information provided 
by the computer program and determined her questions and personal 
concerns.290  Because the patient will be focused and prepared, she can 
make efficient use of the relatively short time she has with the physician.291  
The electronic system will also reduce the information asymmetry between 
the physician and patient, which will allow “them to communicate more 
meaningfully and thus give the patient more influence in the 
decisionmaking process.”292 
With the help of these computer programs, the physician can also make 
more efficient use of this meeting time.  Without these technologies, 
physicians would have the responsibility for educating their patients on 
increasingly complex medical procedures.293  Multimedia electronic 
programs can assume the initial burden of these explanations and give 
physicians time to focus on the patient’s questions, preferences, and 
                                                                                                                 
 288. Brensilver, supra note 247, at 625 (“[B]y sacrificing face-to-face interaction, the 
physician may fail to ascertain the patient’s values and priorities . . . .”). 
 289. Rosoff, supra note 274, at 384 (“If the electronic information disclosure substitutes 
for, rather than supplements, physician face time, . . . [the] trust relationship may be 
sacrificed.”); Brensilver, supra note 247, at 625 (“[T]he establishment of trust, an essential 
element in the physician-patient relationship, is stymied by dependence on electronic 
mediums.”). 
 290. Sobel & Popp, supra note 248, at 21 (“Utilizing an interactive educational tool 
enhances the patient’s appreciation for the specifics of the treatment/procedure, increases 
their awareness of risks, [and] provides information and comfort in knowledge . . . .”).  If 
these computer technologies are adopted, perhaps health coaches could be employed to help 
patients who are not computer savvy or need help with the medical information provided.  
This is not a new idea. There are currently programs that employ health coaches, such as 
HICAP (Health Care Insurance Counseling and Advocacy Program) in California, which 
helps Medicare patients understand their “specific rights and health care options.” CAL. 
HEALTH ADVOC., http://www.cahealthadvocates.org/HICAP (retrieved Aug. 14, 2011). 
 291. Brensilver, supra note 247, at 625 (“The average doctor visit is currently about 
seven minutes, and a ‘well-informed consumer can make the most of that time.’”). 
 292. Rosoff, supra note 274, at 384. 
 293. Sobel & Popp, supra note 248, at 21 (“Physicians are burdened with ever-increasing 
patient volumes and the need to educate these patients regarding the complex and, at times, 
unpredictable behavior of disease.”). 
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concerns.  In this way also, computers enhance the joint decision-making 
process.294 
Physicians can further maximize the effectiveness of the meeting by 
choosing computer systems that test the patient’s knowledge as the program 
progresses.  These programs document that the patient completed the 
presentation and highlight the concepts the patient did not understand.295  
Armed with this report, the physician can determine the areas of 
information the patient finds confusing and focus her discussion on those 
issues.296   
Computer systems can also protect the physician from liability and save 
time and administrative costs.  Reports on patient performance provide 
proof that the patient received and, in most cases, understood the 
information necessary to meet informed consent requirements.297  
Electronic systems can also save the physician time in explaining the 
medical procedures298 and provide savings on personnel and upkeep.299 
Several computer systems are already employing this technology.  The 
Department of Veterans Affairs (VA) adopted the multimedia electronic 
                                                                                                                 
 294. Rosoff, supra note 274, at 370 (“[T]he physician and patient who navigate together 
through [medical] information are engaged in a joint undertaking of great sensitivity and 
significance.”).   
 295. Id. at 368 (“[T]he program will document the patient’s successful completion of the 
instructional exercise and provide proof that the patient understands the material essential to 
his informed consent . . . .”); Pulley, supra note 273 (“HealthGate Data makes an interactive 
tool that educates users and tests whether they are sufficiently informed to give consent.”). 
 296. Brensilver, supra note 247, at 624-25 (“[P]hysicians can use these programs to 
record the areas in which the patient lacks understanding and then address these points more 
thoroughly.”); Rosoff, supra note 274, at 367-68 (“An electronic record will later reveal to 
the doctor the points on which the patient may be uncertain, helping to focus further 
conversation between them.”). 
 297. Rosoff, supra note 274, at 368 (“[T]he computer program generates lasting evidence 
of that communication, in both paper and electronic form, while also documenting the 
patient’s comprehension.”); Kraushar & Steinberg, supra note 152, at 355 (“[I]nforming the 
patient of the risks, benefits, and alternatives of a proposed procedure . . . may prove vital in 
the prevention of a lawsuit.”).   
 298. Rosoff, supra note 274, at 368 (For the doctor's part, he is able to convey to the 
patient all of the relevant and necessary information with significantly less time and effort 
than was formally required.) 
 299. Brensilver, supra note 247, at 625 (“[W]hile initiating an electronic system may be 
costly, its maintenance and upkeep does not require the personnel and materials that often 
cause immense administrative costs.”); see also Landro, supra note 270, at D1 (noting that 
“electronic forms . . . reduce the problem of lost paper forms that delay procedures, adding 
to hospital costs”). 
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system, iMedConsent, for use at all of its 155 medical centers.300  This 
system has “consent forms, . . . patient education documents and an image 
gallery that doctors use to explain complex procedures.”301  The primary 
function of iMedConsent is to provide information to physicians to use in 
their meetings with patients.302  Other programs such as 
YourSurgery.Com,303 Emmi Solutions,304 and X-Plain305 have been 
developed as interactive tools to educate patients directly. 
Use of these programs in conjunction with meaningful physician input 
has the potential to rectify many of the problems related to informed 
consent.306  This will be especially true if federal regulatory bodies help 
ensure that the computer sites are up-to-date and give complete 
information.307  The PPACA has already directed the Secretary of Health 
                                                                                                                 
 300. Pulley, supra note 273 (“iMedConsent [was adopted] to obtain and document 
informed consent at [the VA’s] 155 medical centers. Some Army and Navy centers are also 
using the product.”); Mary Anne Gates, The 411 on Informed Consent, CTAHQ NEWS:  A 
PUBLICATION OF THE CONNECTICUT ASSOCIATION FOR HEALTHCARE QUALITY, Summer 2007, 
at 4 (“iMedConsent, a comprehensive, computer-based patient education solution developed 
by Dialog Medical, provides the basis for the informed consent process in every VA medical 
center. . . . 83,000 health professionals are trained in VA hospitals each year, and more than 
one half of all practicing physicians receive some professional education in the VA 
healthcare system.”). 
 301. Id. (“Whereas iMedConsent primarily supports doctors’ interactions with patients, 
other products educate patients directly.”). 
 302. Id. 
 303. Brensilver, supra note 247, at 624, n.98 (noting that YourSurgery.com contains 
“detailed descriptions on over 50 surgeries” and comes with “anatomy descriptions, 
complications and graphics of the incisions.”). 
 304. Landro, supra note 270, at D1 (“Chicago-based Emmi Solutions, for example, is 
helping hospitals design new informed-consent forms with interactive programs that patients 
can view on a home computer prior to signing.”).  
 305. See PATIENT EDUCATION INSTITUTE, http://www.patient-education.com (last visited 
Jan. 31, 2012). 
 306. Brensilver, supra note 247, at 624 (“The emergence of electronic communication 
creates a unique opportunity to rectify the broken structure of informed consent . . . .”). 
 307. Brensilver, supra note 247, at 629 n.142 (“[I]ncreased cooperation and collaboration 
between state boards is certain to occur, and new and expanded partnerships with federal 
regulatory bodies are likely as policymakers attempt to weigh the benefits to the public’s 
health that this technology can bring, with the threats to the public health its misuse can 
wreak.”) (citing Ross D. Silverman, Regulating Medical Practice in the Cyberage: Issues 
and Challenges for State Medical Boards, 26 AM. J.L. & MED. 255, 276 (2001)). 
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and Human Services to develop standards to review and certify patient 
decision aids.308 
If states switched to a subjective causation standard, making informed 
consent a meaningful cause of action, concerns about lawsuits might 
prompt more hospitals and physicians to use this new technology.  After all, 
using these systems is easy, efficient, and relatively inexpensive,309 and 
improves physician/patient relationships. 
Multimedia electronic education is already becoming an increasingly 
popular method of delivering patient information in health care settings.310 
As the use of electronic informed consent increases, the expectations of the 
reasonable physician and patient regarding required disclosures may change 
accordingly.311  As more and more physicians use computerized systems, 
the easy-to-understand diagrams and detailed information found on these 
websites may become the standard disclosure for reasonable physicians in 
the community and set the professional community standard.  Similarly, as 
more and more patients come to expect that they will receive the type of 
information contained in these systems, easy-to-follow and detailed 
disclosures may be required to meet the patient-oriented standard.  In these 
ways, a push in the right direction may lead to meaningful informed 
consent.   
X. Informed Consent Laws Should Be Changed to Keep Pace with 
Developments in Health Care 
This article has shown that meaningful informed consent can be achieved 
with the help of new technology, but why is change so important now?  
After all, informed consent laws have been around for a long time.  The 
answer has to do with the complexity of current medical decisions. 
The informed consent doctrine began to develop approximately a century 
ago and evolved as medical science advanced.  In the 1970s, roughly half of 
all states enacted informed consent statutes, but the doctrine has changed 
                                                                                                                 
 308. 42 U.S.C. § 299b-36(c)(2)(B); see Rosoff, supra note 274, at 382 (noting that a 
“vendor might [also] undertake a contractual duty to indemnify and hold the physician 
harmless,” if the information in the electronic information was not correct.). 
 309. Brensilver, supra note 247, at 624 n.96 (“The cost per year for a physician to use 
YourSurgery.Com is $100.”).  
 310. Wanzer et al., supra note 274, at 366 (“Using multimedia strategies to deliver 
patient information is becoming increasingly popular in health care settings.”). 
 311. Arabian, supra note 117, at 281 (“As the expectations of the reasonable person 
change, the legal standard to which physicians are held will evolve accordingly.”). 
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little since then.312  Recent developments in medical care demonstrate that 
further modification of the informed consent doctrine is essential to protect 
patient choice.  
When the doctrine of informed consent first developed, medical care was 
generally rudimentary and medical decisions relatively straightforward.313  
Today patients often have several treatment choices, each with different 
risks and benefits.  Because there are multiple options, medical decisions 
are dependent to an ever-greater extent on individual patient values and life 
goals.314  This, in turn, has led to a greater need to protect patient 
preferences and priorities.315  Each of the following examples316—affecting 
thousands to millions of Americans each year—demonstrates the 
importance of medical input from physicians to ensure that patients make 
the choices that best meet their needs.317 
There are five treatment options for early prostate cancer, all with about 
the same chances of success.318  These options are active surveillance, 
                                                                                                                 
 312. Krause, supra note 33, at 272 (“Approximately half of the jurisdictions in the United 
States enacted informed consent statutes in the 1970’s, but little subsequent legislative 
activity has modified the nature of the doctrine itself.”); FURROW ET AL., supra note 227, at 
311 (noting that the “period from 1972 to the present, has seen legislative retrenchment and 
judicial inertia”). 
 313. Sones, supra note 58, at 260 (“[T]he doctrine of informed consent originated at a 
time when medicine was less sophisticated and surgery was relatively new.”); Atwell, supra 
note 69, at 598 (“The doctrine of informed consent dates back to a time when medical 
practice was relatively rudimentary. . . . [and] medical treatments [were] far simpler . . . .”). 
 314. Shultz, supra note 18, at 276 (“Medical uncertainty forces a high degree of election 
in decisionmaking, and extra-medical values necessarily shape resulting choices.”). 
 315. Kathryn Birnie & John Robinson, Helping Patients with Localized Prostate Cancer 
Reach Treatment Decisions, 56 CANADIAN FAMILY PHYSICIAN 137, 139 (2010) (noting that, 
with respect to prostate cancer, “decision models based on average preferences lead to 
suboptimal treatment decisions for by far most patients”). 
 316. For other examples of complex medical choices, see Georgia Akers, On Death and 
Dying: Counseling the Terminally Ill Client and the Loved Ones Left Behind, 1 EST. PLAN. & 
COMMUNITY PROP. L.J. 1, 4 (2008) (“[M]any aggressive treatments of chronic diseases have 
side effects that greatly degrade quality of life.”); Emily C. Kmez et al., The Role of 
Observation in the Management of Atypical Nevi, 102 S. MED. J. 45, 45 (2009) (“[T]he 
question of whether or not partially removed atypical nevi should be re-excised with clear 
margins in order to prevent their evolution into melanoma remains unanswered.”).  
 317. See Kapp, supra note 120, at 101 (“[M]any find the job of being a modern patient, 
with its slog through medical uncertainty, to be lonely, frightening, and overwhelming.”). 
 318. Birnie & Johnson, supra note 315, at 137 (“[P]rostate cancer patients are faced with 
a difficult choice between several medically equivalent treatments.  The decision is further 
confounded by conflicting recommendations from specialists, such as urologists, radiation 
oncologists, and medical oncologists . . . .”). 
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radical prostatectomy, external beam radiotherapy, brachytherapy, and 
cryotherapy.319 Because the treatments are medically equivalent, personal 
goals and values become the deciding factor in making a well-informed 
treatment decision.  
For instance, the potential side effects of prostate surgery include urinary 
incontinence and erectile dysfunction.320  Despite these possible 
complications, some patients still choose surgery because “it is the most 
certain and most expeditious, and . . . provides the most tangible knowledge 
about the cancer.”321  Those who refuse surgery generally cite the risks of 
the procedure as the reason for refusing it.322  Since the treatment’s side 
effects greatly influence decision-making for some men,323 the patient’s 
informational needs and personal preferences must be addressed to 
minimize “decisional regret.”324  
Women with early onset breast cancer are often faced with a choice 
between a mastectomy and a lumpectomy with radiation therapy.325  The 
survival rate is the same for both procedures and both treatments are 
medically justified.326 
                                                                                                                 
 319. Id. 
 320. Understanding Prostate Cancer Side Effects, PROSTATE CANCER FOUND. (Aug. 14, 
2011), http://www.pcf.org/site/c.leJRIROrEpH/b.5822789/k.9652/Side_Effects.htm. 
 321. Birnie & Johnson, supra note 315, at 138. 
 322. Id. 
 323. Id. at 139 (“[T]reatment side effects do play a substantial role in treatment decision 
making and . . . some men, even at the time of diagnosis, are not willing to sacrifice physical 
and sexual function for greater life expectancy.”). 
 324. Id. at 138, 140 (“Passive participation is associated with higher levels of decisional 
regret [one] year following treatment. . . .  Increased patient participation in treatment 
decision making minimizes decisional regret by addressing information needs, facilitating 
values clarification around treatment choice, and helping patients to understand any potential 
side effects.”). 
 325. Andersen-Watts, supra note 250, at 202 (“Today, when diagnosed with early onset 
breast cancer, a woman will often face a choice between lumpectomy, known as breast-
conserving surgery (BCS), and mastectomy.”).  
 326. See id. (“Medical research has yielded conclusive results showing that when faced 
with early stage breast cancer, a woman’s survival rate is the same whether she undergoes 
mastectomy or [lumpectomy].”); see also Steven J. Katz et al., Correlates of Surgical 
Treatment Type for Women with Noninvasive and Invasive Breast Cancer, 10 J. WOMEN’S 
HEALTH & GENDER-BASED MED. 659, 659 (2001) (noting that “compared with mastectomy, 
lumpectomy with radiation therapy provides equal survival benefit . . . .”).  
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Lumpectomy with radiation preserves the breast and may have less 
psychological consequences.327  Women who choose mastectomy generally 
do so because of concerns about the side effects of radiation, fear of 
recurrence, and the desire to avoid additional surgery.328  Again, this is a 
very personal choice, highly dependent on personal concerns and values.329  
Patients making this choice will benefit greatly from a shared decision-
making process that is “sensitive to patient preferences regarding the 
various treatment options.”330  
Medical decisions related to preventing disease may pose equally 
complex and vexing choices.  For example, women with the BRCA1 gene 
have a 60% to 90% chance of developing breast cancer some time in their 
lives331 and about a 50% chance of developing ovarian cancer.332  
                                                                                                                 
 327. Katz et al., supra note 326, at 659 (noting that lumpectomy with radiation therapy 
“preserves the breast, and may yield less psychological sequelae and higher patient 
satisfaction”). 
 328. Steven J. Katz et al., Patient Involvement in Surgery Treatment Decisions for Breast 
Cancer, 23(24) J. CLINICAL ONCOLOGY 5526, 5530 (2005) (“Concerns about disease 
recurrence and radiation effects highly favored receipt of mastectomy.”); see also Andersen-
Watts, supra note 250, at 218 (“Fear of recurrence, concerns about the side effects of 
radiation therapy, and anecdotal reasoning are among the factors that may lead a woman to 
ultimately choose mastectomy over [a lumpectomy].”); Katz et al., supra note 326, at 664 
(noting that “women who were greatly influenced by the desire to reduce the need for 
additional surgery” and “women who were most concerned about the effectiveness of the 
surgical procedures were more likely to have chosen mastectomy”).  
 329. Katz et al., supra note 326, at 5526, 5530 (“Although there is professional 
consensus that most women with early-stage breast cancer are good candidates for breast-
conserving surgery (BCS), more than one third of women with early-stage breast cancer 
were treated with mastectomy in 2001 . . . . [M]ore patient involvement in surgical decision 
making was associated with a greater likelihood of receiving mastectomy.”); Andersen-
Watts, supra note 250, at 202 (“Breast cancer patients must weigh their own preferences and 
values in order to make the best personal decision.”).   
 330. See Andersen-Watts, supra note 250, at 203 n.7 (citing Paula M. Lantz et al, 
Satisfaction with Surgery Outcomes and the Decision Process in a Population-Based Sample 
of Women with Breast-Cancer, 40 HEALTH SERVICES RES. 745, 746 (2005); see also Katz et 
al., supra note 328, at 5527 (“Patient preferences also play an important role in surgical 
treatment decisions [between mastectomy and lumpectomy].”). 
 331. Amy Harmon, Cancer Free at Age 33, but Weighing a Mastectomy, N.Y. TIMES, 
Sept. 16, 2007, http://www.nytimes.com/2007/09/16/health/16gene.html (noting that the 
BRCA1 gene “raises [the] risk of developing breast cancer . . . to between 60 and 90 
percent.”); Dolgin, supra note 54, at 166, n.160 (“[U]p to fifteen percent of women who test 
positive for BRCA1, associated with breast cancer . . . will not develop the condition.”).  
 332. Harmon, supra note 331 (noting that ovarian cancer “strikes about 50 percent of 
BRCA1 carriers, compared with 2 percent of the general population, is rarely detected early 
and is fatal three-quarters of the time”). 
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Approximately one-third of these women opt for preventative 
mastectomies333 and a majority has their ovaries removed.334  Others choose 
drugs to prevent breast cancer or have frequent check-ups.335  Young 
women making these decisions face a challenging and emotionally charged 
choice. 
Another complex treatment choice involves women reaching menopause 
who must decide whether or not to take hormone replacement therapy 
(HRT).336  After a study by the Women’s Health Institute (WHI), women 
were told not to take HRT,337 but some researchers contend that the age of 
the participants in the study skewed the research results.338  Other studies 
suggest that the increased risk of breast cancer is nonexistent339 or very 
small with HRT and that women on HRT live longer340 and have a reduced 
risk of coronary artery disease,341 osteoporotic fractures, and colon 
                                                                                                                 
 333. Id. (noting that about a third of women with the BRCA1 gene “opt for preventative 
mastectomies that remove the tissue where the breast cancer develops.”). 
 334. Id. (noting that a majority of women with the BRCA1 gene “have their ovaries 
removed, halving their breast cancer odds while decreasing the risk of highly lethal ovarian 
cancer”). 
 335. Id. (noting that some women with breast cancer “take drugs that ward off breast 
cancer . . . [or] hope that frequent checkups will catch the cancer early, or that they will beat 
the odds”). 
 336. Avrum Z. Bluming & Carol Tavris, Hormone Replacement Therapy: Real Concerns 
and False Alarms, CANCER J., Mar.-Apr. 2009, at 93, 93 (“Hormone Replacement Therapy 
(HRT) is the term used for the administration of estrogen, or estrogen plus progestin, to 
women who have reached menopause . . . . Estrogen replacement therapy (ERT) alone is 
thus generally given only to women who have had hysterectomies.”).   
 337. Id. (noting that the Women’s Health Initiative (WHI) found that “the risks of HRT 
far outweigh the benefits . . . .”). 
 338. See Cynthia Gorney, The Estrogen Dilemma, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 18, 2010, 
http://www.nytimes.com/2010/04/18/magazine/18estrogen-+.html (“The average age of the 
W.H.I. women was just over 63, though the study accepted women as young as 50 . . . . 
[M]ost of them were many years past . . . menopause, when they began their trial 
hormones.”). 
 339. Bluming & Tavris, supra note 336, at 97 (noting that “the majority of observational 
studies have found no increased risk of breast cancer associated with HRT . . . .”). 
 340. Id. (“[E]ven if HRT increases the risk of breast cancer by this modest increment, 
research suggests that women on HRT live longer than those not taking HRT, and that HRT-
treated women have a lower death rate from breast cancer.”).  
 341. Id. at 98 (“[A] New England Journal of Medicine editorial reported that a consensus 
of epidemiological studies had shown that women who are given postmenopausal estrogen 
have a 40% to 50% reduction in the risk of coronary artery disease in comparison with 
women who do not receive such therapy.”). 
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cancer.342  Clearly, these conflicting studies make decisions concerning 
whether to take HRT confusing and troublesome.343 
Complex decisions related to preventative medicine—like those 
concerning HRT and BRAC1—are likely to increase rapidly as progress in 
genetics and epidemiology provide more detailed risk information.344  All 
of these treatments demonstrate the importance of detailed medical 
disclosure and shared decision-making to help patients navigate the system 
and select optimal treatments based on their values, preferences, and 
concerns.  The help of physicians in providing information and evaluating 
patient preferences is essential, now more than ever before. 
Conclusion 
The informed consent doctrine has developed over the past century to 
keep pace with changes in medical care.  But with the adoption of objective 
causation, the doctrine lost its place as an incentive for positive change.  
Given recent advances in technology and medical care, informed consent is 
ripe for its next evolution. 
 The increasing emphasis on patient autonomy—which is protected by 
informed consent laws—is directly related to the increasing complexity of 
medical care and the wider array of choices available to patients.  But 
choice depends on attention to patient preferences and priorities.  Congress 
has already recognized the need to facilitate protection of patient choice in 
the area of preference sensitive care, defined in the PPACA as involving 
medical conditions that have more than one clinically acceptable treatment.  
The Act specifies that, for these conditions, informed patients should 
choose the appropriate care based on their own preferences or values.345 
                                                                                                                 
 342. Id. at 100 (“Even the WHI confirmed previously published reports of decreased 
risks of osteoporotic fractures and colon cancer for women on HRT.”). 
 343. See id. at 95 (“[T]he relationship between HRT and breast cancer is still not clear 
despite a vast amount of research, study, and reporting over many decades . . . . [T]he list [of 
available research] is a jumble of positive findings, negative findings, and meaningless 
findings.”); Gorney, supra note 338 (“[A] daunting proportion of what we thought we 
learned about hormone replacement over the last eight years remains unsettled [and] more 
confusing than ever . . . .”). 
 344. Peter H. Schwartz, Disclosure and Rationality: Comparative Risk Information and 
Decision-Making about Prevention, 30 THEORETICAL MED. & BIOETHICS 199, 211 (2009) 
(noting that “medicine’s growing focus on prevention and . . . progress in genetics and 
epidemiology promis[e] to make much more detailed risk information available to patients 
and providers in the future.”). 
 345. Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, 42 U.S.C.A. § 299b-36(b)(2) (West 2011) 
(defining preference sensitive care as “medical care for which the clinical evidence does not 
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Although the PPACA contains provisions to facilitate patient choice, the 
courts and state legislatures should also play their part.  Moving away from 
objective causation and adopting a subjective causation standard would 
give vitality to the informed consent cause of action and encourage 
physicians to adopt new technologies to help provide meaningful disclosure 
to patients.   
Subjective causation is a good choice to help achieve this goal. It focuses 
on the choice the patient would have made knowing the risks and 
alternatives.  To make this determination, juries must consider the patient’s 
personal preferences and, if juries will consider this issue, the medical 
community should as well.  Although physicians can avoid liability—even 
with a subjective causation standard—by meeting the requirements of 
objective disclosure, attention to patient values and preferences will provide 
physicians with another layer of protection.   
Sound informed consent laws that protect patient choice would also 
reinforce the public’s support of patient autonomy and conviction that 
patients are entitled to make their own treatment decisions.346  American 
bioethicists, health scholars, and advocates “remain overwhelmingly, 
staunchly in support of the informed consent doctrine and optimistic about 
its serious implementation in clinical practice.”347  The tort system may just 
be “the most powerful irritant” to support meaningful change.348 
                                                                                                                 
clearly support one treatment option such that the appropriate course of treatment depends on the 
values . . . or the preferences of the patient, . . . [so that] use of such care should depend on the 
informed patient choice among clinically appropriate treatment options.”). 
 346. Levine, supra note 122, at 272 (“Recognition of the patient’s right to give informed 
consent demonstrates society’s respect for a patient’s autonomy and bodily integrity and 
more importantly, that the physician’s role is that of an adviser while the patient ultimately 
decides his course of treatment.”).  
 347. Kapp, supra note 120, at 101. 
 348. See Morris, supra note 11, at 369.  
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